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EMINENT DOMAIN BY REGULATION: 
DEVELOPING A UNIFIED FIELD THEORY 
FOR THE REGULATORY TAKING* 
Government can impact private property in two ways. It can 
regulate its use through an exercise of the police power in the 
interest of health, safety and general welfare, 1 or it can appropri-
ate property for public use through eminent domain proceed-
ings.2 Eminent domain involves a taking of property for public 
use.3 The police power involves the regulation of property to 
prevent its use in a manner detrimental to the public interest;' 
The traditional distinction between the scope of the two powers 
is reflected in the remedies for their abuse:6 an eminent domain 
taking requires the payment of just compensation under the 
Fifth Amendment,6 while regulation under the police power is 
• Two major Supreme Court decisions, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church 
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781 (U.S. June 9,1987) and NoHan 
v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (U.S. June 23, 1987), were issued 
while this Comment was in the final stages of publication. For a discussion of their 
impact on the law of regulatory takings, see infra End Note. 
1. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1893); 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN, §1.42 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as "NICHOLS"). 
2. 1 NICHOLS, supra note I, §1.11. According to Nichols, the elements which com-
prise the power of eminent domain are a) the power to take b) without the owner's con-
sent c) for the public use. 
3. 1 NICHOLS, supra note I, §1.11. 
4.Id. 
5. Gordon, Compensable Regulatory Taking: A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation 
Road, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 211, 212 (1984). 
6. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[NJor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. 
V, cl. 4. The fifth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980); Chicago, 
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tested by a Fourteenth Amendment due process standard and is 
subject to invalidation.7 
The distinction between the two powers has broken down. 
Limited in pre-Colonial times to the condemnation of private 
land for roads,S the power of eminent domain is now used to 
enhance community aesthetics.s In Berman v. Parker,I° the 
United States Supreme Court sustained the condemnation of a 
well-maintained store in a generally blighted area as part of a 
redevelopment program. Since his store needed no rehabilita-
tion, and there was therefore no legitimate public purpose for 
condemning it, the owner charged that it should not be included 
in the redevelopment program. The Court upheld the eminent 
domain proceeding on the grounds that the development of a 
more attractive community justified taking the plaintiff's prop-
erty,ll and that public use encompassed spiritual as well as 
physical considerations.12 
The notion of what constitutes a legitimate public interest 
subject to police power regulation has also expanded.13 Initially 
used to impose height limitationsH and to segregate uses, l~ po-
lice power regulations are now used for many of the same pur-
poses as eminent domain, including the resolution of aesthetic 
problems. Billboardl8 and open spacel7 regulations are a familiar 
7. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law . 
. . . " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, cl. 2. 
8. Note, The Origins and Original S,ignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 697 (1985). 
9. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
10. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
11. [d. at 31. 
12. [d. at 33. 
13. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (maintenance of open space); Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (preservation of historical 
landmark); Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1 (1973) (preservation of family 
values); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893) (restraint on the production of alcoholic 
beverages). 
14. Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 (1932). 
15. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
16. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. 
Rptr. 510 (1980), reu'd 453 U.S. 490 (1980). Justice Tobriner, upholding summary judg-
ment against a plaintiff who attacked an ordinance restricting the placement of bill-
boards, warned against succumbing to a bleak materialism and concluded with an Ogden 
Nash ditty: 
I think that I shall never see 
A billboard lovely as a tree. 
2
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result. In Arastra Limited Partnership v. City of Palo Alto,I8 
Palo Alto committed itself to the acquisition of open space 
around an existing city park. Originally intending to purchase 
the land, the City ran into financial problems and placed the 
targeted property into an open space zone. The California Court 
of Appeals found that the zoning ordinance was invalid because 
it plainly intended to achieve eminent domain results. I9 The due 
process standard is flexible. 20 Therefore, social and judicial ac-
ceptance of expanded regulatory objectives2I frequently immu-
nizes them from constitutional attack. In general, a regulation 
need only advance a legitimate state interest and be rationally 
related to that interest in order to survive substantive due pro-
cess attack.22 
The blurring of the lines between what constitutes public 
use for eminent domain and what is considered a proper public 
welfare objective of the police power23 means that government 
purpose can no longer be used to distinguish between the two 
powers. They have become functionally interchangeable.24 The 
Supreme Court's recognition that the two powers are coter-
minus2Ci demands that they be treated not as separate entities, 
but as "two points on a continuum which is the power of govern-
Indeed, unless the billboards fall, 
I'll never see a tree at all. 
Id. at 886, 610 P.2d at 429, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 532. 
17. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), 
vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 
3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). 
18. 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
19. Arastra, 401 F. Supp. at 975. 
20. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926). Euclid foresaw today's expansion of 
the police power in admitting that "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of 
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly 
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected 
as arbitrary and oppressive." Id. at 387. 
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
22. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395; Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928). 
23. Costonis, 'Fair' Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for 
the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (1975). 
24.Id. 
25. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). Seven members of the 
Court joined in the Midkiff opinion; Justice Rehnquist dissented, and Justice Marshall 
did not take part in the proceedings. The Court repeated its characterization of the 
"two" powers in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984). 
3
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ment".28 The tension between the traditional "correlative 
view",27 which sees the two powers as "very different",28 and the 
more recent approach, which openly admits that they are inter-
changeable,29 has produced what one writer characterized as 
"doctrinal schizophrenia".30 That schizophrenia, coupled with 
the eagerness of some state and local governments to use the 
police power as a less expensive alternative to eminent domain,3t 
has, in turn, produced a judicial crisis: if government has exer-
cised the police power for a condemnatory purpose, i.e., to ex-
tract a public use, then Fifth Amendment compensatory, not 
Fourteenth Amendment equitable, remedies are appropriate. 
As early as 1871, some courts recognized that a taking could 
occur without formal condemnation.32 Judicial recognition of the 
regulatory taking is now widespread,33 but courts remain reluc-
tant to find compensable takings.34 Many are inclined to treat 
alleged regulatory takings as an improper exercise of the police 
power,3G ignoring their condemnatory overtones. Such courts 
26. Berger and Kanner, Thoughts on the 'White River Junction Manifesto': A Re-
ply to the 'Gang of Five's' Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings of 
Property, 19 Loy. L. REV. 685, 724 (1986). See also Bauman, The Supreme Court, In-
verse Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevi-
table in Land Use Controls, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 15, 33 (1983). Bauman feels that there is "a 
consistent constitutional scheme ... in which regulating and taking are merely polar 
ends of the entire spectrum of governmental power." 
27. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1035. 
28. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1893). 
29. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240: "The 'public use' requirement is thus coterminus with 
the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 
986, 1014 (1984). 
30. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1047. 
31. See Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The City of Palo Alto received infor-
mation on the use of zoning as an alternative to eminent domain in public hearings. Id. 
at 974. 
32. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 179 (1871). 
33. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Wil-
liamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986 (1984); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); 
Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Penn Central Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); United States v. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 
155 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). MacDonald, William-
son, Agins and Penn Central apply the principle to land use regulations. 
34. Although the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the theoretical exis-
tence of a regulatory taking in 1922 in Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393, the Court has 
never found a compensable taking. See supra note 33. 
35. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893); Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 
4
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have been willing to excuse regulations which in effect "took" 
seventy-five percent,86 eighty-seven percent37 and even arguably 
one hundred percent88 of the underlying property value. Other 
courts treat police power takings as hybrids, viewing them as ex-
cessive but legitimate regulations which become, at some unde-
fined point, condemnatory.89 Still others avoid dealing with the 
taking issue by finding taking claims premature because admin-
istrative remedies have not been exhausted,·o or by abstaining.·1 
Those courts which are willing to find compensable takings·2 sel-
dom agree on compensation,·8 acknowledging that eminent do-
P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 
2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). 
36. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926). 
37. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915). 
38. Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W. 2d 761 (1972). The Just court found 
that a county shore lands ordinance did not depreciate the value of the plaintiff's land 
because it was in its natural state. It held that depreciation could not be based on possi-
ble uses, but on the existing condition of the property, and that value based on changing 
the character of the land was not an essential or controlling factor in evaluating a taking 
claim. Id. at 23, 201 N.W.2d 771. 
39. The Supreme Court articulated the classic view of the so-called continuum ap-
proach to regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 
(1922): "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Although the Califor-
nia Supreme Court tried to distinguish Justice Holmes' comments as an indication of the 
point at which due process was violated, most courts have interpreted them as indicating 
that, at some point, a regulation becomes an exercise of eminent domain. See cases cited 
supra note 33. 
40. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); 
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); and Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See also Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 
Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980). Although the owner was entangled in a multi-agency 
administrative maze, the court held that the burden of exhausting each agency's individ-
ual remedies did not excuse the owner's failure to do so. Id. at 292-94, 418 A.2d 1165. 
41. For a discussion of the alleged abuse of the abstention doctrine in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, .~ee Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 694-95. 
42. See, e.g., Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); Sheerr v. Eve-
sham Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982); Ventures in Property Inv. v. 
City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 
389 (Tex. 1978); Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 
(1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979); 
Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 224 N.E.2d 700 
(1966). 
43. Contrast Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982 
(N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (city ordered to pay the fair 
market value of fee title, not easement value), and Sixth Camden v. Evesham Township, 
420 F. Supp. 709, 729, (D.N.J. 1976) (temporary damages awarded on the basis of the 
fair rental value of the property). 
5
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main standards for just compensation do not easily apply to 
regulatory takings." 
The search for regulatory taking standards has been com-
pared to the physicist's . hunt for the quark.4!! Because of the 
clear constitutional mandate that just compensation be paid 
when land is taken for public use,46 it is critical that the courts 
promulgate clear regulatory taking standards and establish uni-
form criteria for valuing the compensation due. Development of 
a unified field theory for takings is imperative: nothing less than 
the Constitution demands that we find the quark. 
I. THERE IS NO CLEAR STANDARD FOR THE REGULA-
TORY TAKING 
James Madison, who wrote the Fifth Amendment, intended 
the clause to apply only to direct physical takings of property by 
the federal government.47 As a result, the courts are still strug-
gling to apply the physical taking criteria of eminent domain to 
regulatory takings.48 Most courts are willing to concede a regula-
tory taking when physical invasion is involved,49 but beyond 
this, there is little agreement regarding taking criteria. 
The definition of regulatory taking standards involves four 
primary problems, the first being the sheer variety of regulatory 
44. See, e.g., Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 438, 334 N.W.2d 67, 77 (1983) (Abra-
hamson, J., concurring), where Justice Abrahamson ruefully admitted that, despite the 
majority's willingness to find a regulatory taking, the plaintiff would have a hard time 
establishing damages since the court was forced, essentially, to value a cloud on title. 
45.C. HAAR. LAND-USE PLANNING: A CASEBOOK ON THE USE. MISUSE AND RE-USE OF 
URBAN LAND, 766 (3d ed. 1976). 
46. See supra note 7. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 
U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the payment of just compensation is not 
precatory). 
47. Note, supra note 8, at 711. 
48. Compare United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945) and Fred F. French Inv. 
Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). Causby 
found that defendant's overflights effected a physical invasion of plaintiff's airspace, 
while Fred F. French found no physical invasion even though plaintiff's private parks 
were opened to the public by zoning regulations. Physical invasion often plays a sub rosa 
role in court decisions such as Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), in 
which the Army Corps of Engineers was not allowed to force a developer to open a pri-
vate lagoon to the public, even though the lagoon was connected to navigable waters and 
under the Corps' jurisdiction. 
49. See Causby, 328 U.S. 256. 
6
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acts. IIO A second problem arises from the fact that, while regula-
tion can have the same impact as an exercise of eminent do-
main,1I1 eminent domain taking standards are not directly appli-
cable. The confusion in judicial precedent creates an additional 
problem, while a fourth, and final, problem arises from the 
quicksilver nature of regulation itself: revocable, amendable and 
endlessly flexible. 
The police power's broad basis of legitimacy in health, 
safety, general welfare and morals results in a hard-to-categorize 
array of regulatory acts.1I2 In a land use context, the police power 
can be exercised to segregate residential and industrial areas,IIS 
extinguish noxious usesll4 and postpone development,1I1I subject 
only to basic substantive and procedural due process limitations. 
An act of regulation does not always result in a regulatory tak-
ing, while eminent domain proceedings always take property.1I6 
As Justice Holmes noted in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon: 1I7 
Government could hardly go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be dimin-
ished without paying for every such change in the 
general law. As long recognized, some values are 
enjoyed under an implied limitation, and must 
yield to the police power. liS 
In eminent domain proceedings, title passes to the govern-
50. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of gravel 
extraction below the water table); Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) 
(state Department of Natural Resources ruling regarding ordinary high water mark); 
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979) (imposition of 
open space restrictions); Cordeco Development Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 
(1st Cir. 1976) (local government refused to issue a sand extraction permit). 
51. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
52. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §1.42; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893). 
53. Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
54. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893). See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 
U.S. 590 (1962), and Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 108 Ariz. 
178,494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
55. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 
(1972). 
56. Hagman, 33 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 5 (May, 1981). 
57. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
58. [d. at 413. 
7
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ment, which appropriates the land for public use.1i9 Ordinarily, 
an act of regulation neither transfers title to the government, 
(although it may result in a de facto transfer of ownership),60 
nor confers the right to use or possession of private property to 
the government.61 
Eminent domain criteria are not decisive in most regulatory 
taking cases. Early cases quickly recognized that, even absent 
formal eminent domain proceedings, a de facto condemnation 
could occur.62 These cases generally relied on finding govern-
mental acts which resulted in a physical invasion of property.63 
The physical invasion standard, while useful,64 does not resolve 
the regulatory taking issue. A regulation may deprive an owner 
of the use and benefit of land without conferring any rights of 
possession or use on the public.61i 
59. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); see also 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954). 
60. See Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967); see also Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 
2d 417, 334 N.W. 2d 67 (1983), in which a state Department of Natural Resources ruling 
regarding the location of the ordinary high water mark effectively transferred 200 acres 
of plaintiff's lakefront property to the state. 
61. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 
5,350 N.E.2d 381 (1976), however, where New York City placed two private parks into a 
special park district and opened them to the public. 
62. Inverse condemnation is the appropriate remedy in such cases. The owner is 
permitted to bring suit against the government for just compensation if his property is 
taken or damaged for public use and no eminent domain proceedings have been insti-
tuted. See United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). In California, the remedy is 
frequently sought where government activity produces landslides which affect land that 
has not been condemned. See, e.g., Souza v. Silver Development Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 
165, 210 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1985); Yee v. City of Sausalito, 141 Cal. App. 3d 917, 190 Cal. 
Rptr. 595 (1983). 
63. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1945), which found that bomber 
overflights from a military airport "took" the plaintiff's property. In finding the taking, 
the court first decided that the owner had a cognizable property interest in as much 
airspace as he could reasonably use in connection with his on-ground activities. [d. at 
264. The court then found that that airspace had been invaded by the overflights, which 
constituted a taking because they were a direct and immediate interference with the 
owner's use and enjoyment of his land. [d. at 264-65. 
64. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979). In Kaiser, the Su-
preme Court struck down a lower court ruling that a private developer's ocean channel 
had turned its marina into navigable federal waters open to the public. 
65. The so-called "open space" easements are a prime example. Although the 
owner's use is restricted in order to prevent development, the public seldom acquires an 
affirmative right to use the property. But see Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo 
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976), for 
an example of an ordinance which apparently contemplated "forcing" recreational use of 
private property by using the open space designation. The battle over the Palo Alto, 
California, foothills has been a source of considerable litigation. See also Eldridge v. City 
8
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The case law on regulatory takings is inconsistent. At the 
federal level, taking standards vacillate between two primary 
philosophical strains: the so-called proprietary interest test66 es-
tablished by Justice Harlan in Mugler v. Kansas67 and the more 
flexible continuum test68 announced by Justice Holmes in Penn-
sylvania Coal Company v. Mahon. 69 In Mugler, Justice Harlan 
rejected a due process challenge to a Kansas dry law which pro-
hibited the manufacture of beer for sale.70 Justice Harlan 
warned that an exercise of the police power was never a taking 
or compensable since it was totally distinct from the power of 
eminent domain. 71 The ordinance in question, he held, was a le-
gitimate exercise of the police power because it abated a nui-
sance72 and did not involve physical invasion or appropriation of 
the property by the government.7S For Justice Harlan, there was 
a qualitative difference between the police power and the power 
of eminent domain.7• 
Twenty-nine years later, in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. 
Mahon, Justice Holmes rejected Justice Harlan's view that the 
two powers were distinct and theorized that a regulation that 
went "too far" could be recognized as a taking,76 finding a quan-
titative rather than a qualitative difference between the powers. 
Justice Holmes' continuum test and Justice Harlan's proprietary 
interest test, like oil and water, do not mix well. 
of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 
598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), where an intermediate appellate court 
found a compensable regulatory taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 
(1922) is arguably another example of the fact that a regulation can "take" land without 
conferring any affirmative benefit on the public. The benefit conferred by the Kohler Act 
in that case - the support pillars - would have devolved on the private property owners, 
not the public. 
66. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1893). Justice Harlan felt a regulation could 
never be a taking as there was no governmental invasion or appropriation. [d. at 668-69. 
See also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 
350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). 
67. 123 U.S. 623 (1893). 
68. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
69. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. 393. 
70. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 654-56. 
71. [d. at 668-69. 
72. [d. at 662. 
73. [d. at 668-69. 
74. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 39 (1964). 
75. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
9
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In 1984, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff6 placed the 
Supreme Court squarely in the Holmes camp.77 However, the 
ongoing conflict between the two judicial strains has spawned a 
perplexing ambiguity in present state and federal court stan-
dards for regulatory taking.78 Some courts continue to rigidly 
distinguish between regulation and appropriation, holding that 
the only remedy for an improper exercise of the police power is 
invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment as a taking of 
property_ without due process.79 Others more readily find com-
pensable takings,80 even when the ordinance in question survives 
due process scrutiny.81 Still others agree that a regulation can 
effect a Fifth Amendment taking, but insist that compensation 
is due only if the taking is permanent.82 The result is a "serbo-
nian bog".83 Modifications in the federal taking standard further 
complicate the equation. Justice Holmes attempted to provide a 
yardstick for measuring the "too far" he referred to in Pennsyl-
vania Coal by noting that diminution of property value was one 
factor for consideration.84 When diminution reached a certain 
magnitude, an exercise of eminent domain and compensation 
were required to sustain the regulatory act.86 The Penn Cen-
tral86 decision expanded Justice Holmes' test into a three-
pronged inquiry into the impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant, the degree of interference with distinct investment-backed 
expectations, and the character of the governmental action, 
76. 467 U.S. 229 (1983). 
77. Id. at 240. Accord Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014 (1984). 
78. Sax, supra note 74, at 42. 
79. See Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). 
80. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). 
81. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), 
vacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). In Eldridge, 
the landowner conceded that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, but 
insisted it effected a taking nonetheless. Id. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577. The California 
Court of Appeals agreed. Id. at 631-33, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586-87. 
82. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232, 15 N.E.2d 
587, 592 (1938). 
83. See Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a 
Damages Remedy in Challenging Land Use Regulations; 29 U.C.LA L.REV. 711 (1982). 
The author uses the phrase to refer to state approaches to the taking issue, but it is 
equally applicable to the federal courts. The phrase has been used in numerous judicial 
opinions to describe the "marshlands" where the allegedly separate police power and 
eminent domain intersect: City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978), 
Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 176,354 S.W.2d 99, 105 (1962). 
84. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
85. Id. 
86. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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including whether it involved physical invasion.87 The most re-
cent cases appear to have crystallized the three-pronged test 
into something of a dogma.88 In addition, the Court now requires 
that a cognizable property interest be taken89 and that the final-
ity requirement be met.90 ' 
The problem of defining taking standards is further compli-
cated by the fact that land use regulations are not an "all-or-
nothing" proposition.91 Zoning can be changed or invalidated, 
regulations amended or revoked.92 Denial of a particular devel-
opment plan is not equivalent to an agency's refusal to permit 
any development.93 The impermanence problem clearly troubles 
courts struggling to develop a regulatory taking standard. The 
Supreme Court appears willing to find a taking despite the im-
permanence of most land use regulations.9' However, its early 
frustration with an applicant's failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies91i has crystallized into a doctrinal insistence on exhaus-
tion as part of the taking standard.96 Unfortunately, institution-
alization of the exhaustion requirement does not clarify what is 
final in a land use context. A Rubik's cube of interlocking ad-
ministrative agencies may provide virtually inexhaustible 
though fruitless - opportunities to reapply or appeal. 
Superimposing the eminent domain model on an exercise of 
the police power does not produce reliable standards for the 
87. [d. at 124. 
88. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 
164, 175 (1979). 
89. Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at 1000-01; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130. 
90. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986); 
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985). 
91. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565. 
92. See Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 700, who characterize the regulatory 
system as "a monumental crap game". 
93. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2565. 
94. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting): "Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' 
must be permanent and irrevocable." 
95. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978). The 
Court found that the Landmark Preservation Commission's refusal to approve the two 
plans submitted did not amount to a blanket denial of any development of the airspace 
above the terminal. This finding was an important corollary to its holding that no taking 
had been effected. [d. at 138. 
96. See MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; and Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamil-
ton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985). 
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regulatory taking. Debating the appropriate remedy for an ex-
cessive regulation does not provide standards either. As noted in 
a recent taking case,97 viewing a regulation that goes "too far" as 
a taking or an invalid exercise of the police power does not re-
solve what "too far" is.98 
II. MODIFICATIONS TO CURRENT REGULATORY TAK-
ING THEORY CAN PRODUCE A WORKABLE STANDARD 
Three modifications to current taking theory will help clar-
ify when a taking has occurred: clarification of the property in-
terest at stake, addition of a circumstantial review standard, and 
definition of the finality requirement. 
A. THE PROPERTY INTEREST 
Property, in a constitutional sense, is not a physical thing, 
but a group of rights which the owner of the thing has regarding 
it. 99 Although the Constitution requires just compensation for 
the taking of property,lOO property interests are not created by 
the Constitution, but by existing rules or understandings that 
stem from independent sources, including state law.101 
It is not at all clear that economic value is a property inter-
est.102 The community defines propertyl03 and creates property 
97. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. 3108. 
98. [d. at 105 S. Ct. 3123-24. 
99. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945). 
100. U.S. Con st. amend V, cl. 4. 
101. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Board of Regents v. 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1971). See generally Michelman, Property, Utility and Fair-
ness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L.R. 
1165 (1967), and Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 
(1971). Michelman advances a utility theory of property. He claims that productivity is 
dependent on the existence of reliable rules regarding the relationship of citizens to re-
sources, and that regulation should be compensable only if it has a net demoralizing 
impact. Michelman at 1212-13. Sax, on the other hand, adopts a vision of property as a 
system of interrelated, competing uses, and feels regulation should be compensable only 
if the effects of the regulated activity are contained within the boundaries of the desig-
nated property and do not "spillover". Since most uses do have spillover effects, he 
would find few regulations compensable. Sax at 150, 161-63. 
102. Sax, supra note 74, at 51-53. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979): 
"[L]oss of future profits - unaccompanied by any physical property restriction - provides 
a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim." Because of its uncertainty, an inter-
est in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other prop-
12
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values. l04 Since, as Justice Holmes observed, some values are 
subject to an implied limitation,loll the courts have been chary of 
finding that existing value was a property interest for purposes 
of the Fifth Amendment. loe Instead of an automatic compensa-
tion requirement for any regulatory impact on value, the Su-
preme Court adopted the "diminution of value" standard, under 
which an excess of value must be taken before compensation is 
due. l07 
Focusing on value as the primary property interest at stake 
is misplaced. Justice Brennan wrote in Penn Central that dimi-
nution in value alone could not create a taking. l08 The courts 
have excused regulatory impacts which almost wholly devalued 
property. IDe The value of land arises from its usefulness,11o and 
land can be diminished in value without denying all use.lll In a 
regulatory context, the diminution of value is a result of the re-
striction of use. Therefore, the focus should be on the cause -
the restriction - not on the diminished value, which is only an 
effect. The restriction of use rather than the diminution in value 
should be determinative.ll2 
erty related interests. Id. at 66. 
103. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
104. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597, 385 N.Y.S.2d 
5, 11, 350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976). 
105. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
106. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66: "[B)ecause of its very uncertainty, the interest in antic-
ipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related 
interests. " 
107. Pennsyluania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. See also Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 
2d 359, 381, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 155, 285 N.E.2d 291, 304 (1972): "Diminution ... is a 
relative factor and though its magnitude is an indica of a taking, it does not of itself 
establish a confiscation." 
108. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); see 
also Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66, regarding the insufficiency of loss of future profits to estab-
lish a taking. 
109. See supra notes 36, 37 and 38. 
110. Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 88, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189, 224 
N.E.2d 700, 703 (1966), citing Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977: "All 
that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the fruits of that use, and whatever 
deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is desirable or valuable in the title and 
possession." See also Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 592, 194 N.W. 159, 162 (1923), and 
Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11, 
350 N.E.2d 381, 387 (1976). 
111. See generally Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
112. Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 54, 445 A.2d 46, 69 (1982). 
See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 (diminution in value alone is not a taking; the 
court must focus on remaining permitted uses). Accord Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 
13
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A regulatory taking does not require deprivation of all use. 
The cases seem to draw the line not at deprivation of all use but 
at deprivation of profitable use of property. lIS Some courts find 
that deprivation of reasonable or beneficial use results in a tak-
ing.1l4 Others couch the taking in terms of deprivation of the 
economically viable use of land,tIlI or the right to possess and 
exploit.1I6 While it is clear that deprivation of all use is a tak-
ing,117 the deprivation of income productive use seems to be the 
critical factor. lIS 
In Morris County Land Investment Company v. Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills Township,ll9 the New Jersey Supreme Court 
invalidated a Meadow Zone Ordinance which restricted the 
owner of 66 lowland acres to passive uses such as conservation, 
aquaculture and agriculture.12o Such uses, the court found, were 
quasi-public, afforded no financial return to the owner and 
amounted to a freeze on use.121 The court agreed that a 
424,334 N.W.2d 67, 70 (1983); Arverne Bay Const. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 232,15 
N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938). See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 
621, 646-53, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan seems to refer to deprivation of 
use as the equivalent to economic impact on property. [d. at 646-53. The interests are 
distinct, but the failure to distinguish them is not unusual and is indicative of the need 
to clarify the property interest at stake in a taking case. Permitted uses obviously impact 
value, but that does not mean the two property interests are identical. See Bauman, 
supra note 26, at 31. 
113. Note, Money Damages for Regulatory Takings, 23 NAT. RES. J. 711, 719 (1983). 
Contrast Justice Brennan's San Diego Gas test (deprivation of "use and enjoyment", 450 
U.S. at 656-57) with the Fifth Circuit's characterization of the standard in Hernandez v. 
City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 907 (1982) 
(denial of "economically viable use"). 
114. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Usdin v. State Dept. 
of Environmental Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 323, 414 A.2d 280, 286 (1980); Just v. 
Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15,201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 
2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). 
115. See Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Hernandez v. 
City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1980); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo 
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The 
Burrows case dealt with whether there was a taking under the state constitution. 
116. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262 (1945). 
117. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Zinn v. State, 
112 Wis. 2d 417, 429, 334 N.W.2d 67, 73 (1983); Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsip-
pany-Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 557, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963); Arverne Bay Con-
struction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226, 15 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1938). 
118. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 590-91, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 5, 7, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (1976); Parsippany at 557, 193 A.2d at 242. 
119. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
120. [d. at 545, 193 A.2d at 236. 
121. [d. at 552-53, 193 A.2d at 240. 
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regulation was confiscatory when it so restricted use that the 
land could not practically be utilized for any reasonable purpose 
or when the only permanent uses were those to which the prop-
erty was not adapted or which were economically infeasible.122 
Admittedly, land in its natural state can still be used.123 Not-
withstanding a minority view which found that restriction to 
natural use was not a taking,124 such restrictions seem to be a 
compensable Fifth Amendment violation since the public uses 
- primarily open space - are so encompassing that they pre-
vent the owner's exercise of his right to use or benefit.126 
Although the right to use is already recognized as a property 
interest,126 viewing it as a fundamental property interest would 
simplify taking standards and valuation. Ordinarily, taking a 
discrete property interest, destroying one strand in the bundle of 
property rights, does not constitute a takingl27 "because the ag-
gregate must be viewed in its entirety"!28 Taking a fundamental 
property right, however, even if it is only a single strand in the 
bundle, triggers the Fifth Amendment!29 
While the Supreme Court has taken an expansive view of 
what constitutes property for taking purposes,130 it has been ret-
icent regarding which property rights are fundamental. 131 It is 
clear that the right to exclude is a fundamental property right. 132 
122. Id. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242. 
123. See Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
124. Id. 
125. Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 555-56, 
193 A.2d 232, 241-42 (1963). 
126. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Piper v. 
Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 593, 194 N.W. 159, 162 (1923). 
127. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
128. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979). 
129. Id. 
130. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 476 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secrets); Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1959) (business interests, including a security inter-
est in chattels); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958) (right 
to engage in a particular business); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934) 
(interest in insurance contract). See also Johnson, Compensation for Inualid Land Use 
Regulations, 15 GA. L.REV. 559, 581 (1981). 
131. Johnson, supra note 130, at 569. 
132. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). See also Ruckelshaus, 476 U.S. at lOll, which 
held that the government's disclosure of trade secrets in the process of conducting 
FIFRA licensing "took" the right to exclude; such disclosure, the court found, resulted in 
loss of the property interest. 
15
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However, it is not clear what other property rights are funda-
mental since the Supreme Court has not given us any criteria for 
making such determinations. 133 However, criteria can be 
extracted. 
The reason the right to exclude is a fundamental property 
right is because it is directly related to an owner's right to use 
his property;134 without it, property ownership is meaningless. m 
In Prune Yard Shopping Center u. Robins/ 36 the United States 
Supreme Court held that forcing a California shopping center to 
allow the circulation of petitions on its premises was not a tak-
ing because the center failed to show that exclusion of the peti-
tioners was essential to protect the center's usefulness or 
value. 137 Based on Prune Yard, it appears that the right to ex-
clude is a fundamental property interest only when it is essential 
to maintain use and value, which is based on use. If this is true, 
then the right to use is an even more fundamental property in-
terest than the right to exclude. The United States Supreme 
Court recognized in 1893 that the adequacy of the protection 
given the individual in his use and enjoyment of property is one 
of the most certain tests of the character of government.138 The 
right to beneficial use must be recognized as the fundamental 
property interest at stake in a regulatory taking.139 
The right to use is a concept which can be manipulated. 140 
Uses can be classified as active or passive, present or prospec-
tive. In deciding whether the right to use has been taken, courts 
generally focus on whether a regulation deprives an owner of all 
active uses, not on whether it denies him additional uses. In 
Penn Central, Justice Brandeis focused on the existence of re-
maining permitted uses in evaluating whether a regulatory 
133. Johnson, supra note 130, at 569. 
134. Prune Yard, 447 U.S. at 84. 
135. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 722. 
136. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
137. [d. at 84. 
138. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893). 
139. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 722, agree: "It should be self-evident 
that, of all the rights arising from the concept of property, the right to use property in a 
lawful, reasonable, peaceful and profitable manner is the most fundamental." (Emphasis 
original). 
140. See Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), which held that 
enjoyment of shoreline property in its natural state was reasonable use. 
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taking had occurred. HI The City of New York denied the Penn 
Central Transport Company the right to build in the airspace 
above Grand Central Station because of the building's landmark 
status."2 Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, found that 
although the ordinance did not permit development of the air-
space, it did not interfere with existing uses which permitted a 
reasonable return on Penn Central's investments. I43 In Morris 
County Land Investment Company v. Parsippany-Troy Hills 
Township,144 however, the New Jersey Supreme Court found 
that the owner was restricted to passive conservation uses of his 
66 acres of swamp because township ordinances prohibited rec-
lamation. 14~ As a result, the court found that the township had 
confiscated the land.148 If the effect of a regulation is to prevent 
all active use, then a taking has occurred and compensation is 
due. I47 
Local government cannot avoid the taking issue by arguing 
that a property interest does not exist. Although property rights 
arise under rules and understandings stemming from sources 
such as state law,148 whether such entitlements exist is a ques-
tion of federal constitutional law. us 
State efforts to limit an owner's right to use may conflict 
with the Supremacy ClauseI~o in two ways: 
1. Rights to use can arise from sources other than state law. 
Board of Regents v. RothI~I indicates that property rights arise 
from "sources such as state law."1~2 The case language is an il-
lustrative, not an exclusive, indication of the sources of property 
141. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.s. 104, 136 (1978). 
142. [d. at 115-18. 
143. [d. at 136. 
144. 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
145. [d. at 557, 193 A.2d at 243. 
146. [d. 
147. [d. at 557, 193 A.2d at 242. 
148. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
149. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 796 (1980) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
150. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution ... 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing ... in the Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." 
151. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
152. [d. at 577. (Emphasis added). 
17
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rights. A state cannot decide whether or not a property right 
arising outside state law exists. 
2. Federal and state standards regarding the existence of a 
right to use may conflict. For example, the Supreme Court has 
indicated that the presence of reasonable or distinct investment-
backed expectations is one of the factors to be considered in 
evaluating whether a taking has occurred. I113 The treatment of 
the phrase in the case law and legal literature indicates that in-
vestment-backed expectations are a property interest. 1M 
The Supreme Court's admonition that distinct investment-
backed expectations must be "more than a 'unilateral expecta-
tion or an abstract need' "11111 sounds suspiciously like its charac-
terization of property in Board of Regents v. Roth. ll1S Further-
more, since "economic impact on the owner" is treated as a 
separate taking inquiry in the more recent cases,1117 the Court 
apparently means distinct investment-backed expectations to be 
more than mere economic 10SS.1118 
A right to use may exist based on the federal "expectations" 
standard even though state law does not recognize a property 
interest. In California, for example, a developer has no protected 
153. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Accord 
Connolly v. Pension Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). 
154. See Michelman, supra note 101, at 1232-33. Michelman seems to feel that at 
some point an owner's expectations of use become a right to use, based on the size and 
reasonableness of his investment in those expectations. [d. at 1233. The Michelman arti-
cle was apparently the source of the Penn Central reference to "distinct investment-
backed expectations." Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. See Bauman, supra note 26, at 23 
n.34. 
155. Ruchelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005, quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. 
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980). 
156. 480 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
157. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018, 1026 (1986); 
Ruchelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005. 
158. Unfortunately, the Court has done little to clarify when investment-backed ex-
pectations are distinct or reasonable. It is unclear, for example, whether reasonableness 
is related to the strength of the state's interest or the reasonableness of state law. If the 
state's regulatory interest relates to preservation of a flood plain, is the strength of an 
owner's investment-backed expectations less than if the state has an interest in open 
space? Is the standard for reasonableness higher in a jurisdiction like California where 
an owner knows he will have no vested rights until he pulls his permits and completes 
substantial work? The parameters of distinct investment-backed expectations are far too 
indistinct. 
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property interest in a use until the right vestsUi9- and no vested 
right until he pulls his building permits and completes substan-
tial work in reliance on the permits.160 An owner may have dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations in a use long before he 
pulls his building permits. Local government cannot abridge 
that interest without paying just compensation by arguing that 
no property interest exists to be taken. l6l Under the Supremacy 
Clause, federal constitutional law governs whether that interest 
exists and whether it has been taken. Property rights are pro-
tected not because the states give them protected status, but be-
cause the Constitution insists on their protection.162 
B. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL REVIEW STANDARD 
The blurring of the distinction between the eminent domain 
and police powers makes the principal legal tests for regulatory 
taking inadequate.163 Justice Harlan's proprietary interest test, 
with its emphasis on physical invasion or appropriation, is not 
sensitive to land use situations where an owner's use is taken 
without the use or fee being transferred to the public. The 
Holmes test, which focuses on diminuation in value and treats 
the eminent domain and police powers as points on a contin-
uum, and its spin-off, the Penn Central balancing test,164 result 
in confusion.166 Since value is a function of an owner's ability to 
use, the Holmes' test focuses on the wrong property interest. 
Most courts, under either test, have recognized that regula-
tory takings are a product of a state's acts, not its expressed 
159. Del Mar v. Coastal Comm'n, 152 Cal. App. 3d 49, 52, 199 Cal. Rptr. 225,226·32 
(1984); Pescosolido v. Smith, 142 Cal. App. 3d 964, 969·70, 191 Cal. Rptr. 415, 418·19 
(1983). 
160. Contra Costa Theatre, Inc. v. City of Concord, 511 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D.C. Cal. 
1980); Blue Chip Properties v. Permanent Rent Control Bd., 170 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658· 
59, 216 Cal. Rptr. 492, 497 (1985). 
161. Appellant's Reply Brief at 19·20, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of 
Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84·2015). 
162. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §9·4, at 465 (1978). 
163. City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Tex. 1978). 
164. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
165. Bauman, supra note 26, at 24. 
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intent.ls8 As the Supreme Court noted in Hughes v. Wash-
ington: IS7 
[T]he Constitution measures a taking of property 
not by what a state says, or by what it intends, 
but by what it does. (emphasis original)16S 
As a result, many courts are now moving toward a circumstantial 
review standard. 
The test under the circumstantial standard is whether 
"there exists some combination of factors which, in context, con-
vincingly suggest that the cumulative effect of the regulatory 
course of conduct has been to work a de facto appropriation of 
private property without compensation".189 An exercise of the 
police power is presumed valid, and the courts generally defer to 
regulatory acts. l7O However, the courts can look at the prior his-
tory, nature and scope of the government's behavior in deciding 
whether there has been an oppressive confiscation. l71 
166. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967). In Hughes, the plaintiff chal-
lenged a Washington State Statute which would have reversed a common law rule that 
accreted ocean-front land belonged to adjacent property owners, not the state. The Su-
preme Court went on to say that "[aJlthough the State in this case made no attempt to 
take the accreted lands by eminent domain, it achieved the same result by effecting a 
retroactive transformation of private into public property - without paying for the privi-
lege of doing so." [d. at 298. See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 
U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), citing Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967): "In de-
ciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this court focuses. 
rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent o~ the interfer-
ence with rights in the parcel as a whole .... "; Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo 
Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976): 
"Distinguishing between the exercise of the two powers is not always easy ... [wJhich of 
the powers is being used does not necessarily appear from the form in which the commu-
nity puts its action." See generally Bauman, supra note 26, at 25, describing "the Su-
preme Court's consistent pattern of judging the effects of government action rather than 
dwelling on the mode of government operation." 
167. 389 U.S. 290 (1967). 
168. [d. at 298. 
169. See Comment, supra note 83, at 738. According to the author, factors relevant 
to the consideration of whether the government's course of conduct has effected a taking 
would include: repeated public pronouncements of intent to employ the property for 
public use, condemnation threats, institution and abandonment of eminent domain ac-
tions, inclusion of the property in general zoning plans or studies, its identification as 
property targeted for acquisition in a bond or referendum election, its professed utility 
in terms of proximity to ongoing public activity, the timing of various regulatory actions, 
and variations in taking policy. [d. at 738. 
170. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of 
Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962,979 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 
1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 377, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 151, 285 N.E.2d 
291, 301 (1972). See also Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 706, who feel that under 
the coterminus theory of the police and condemnation powers, a regulatory act should 
receive as much judicial deference as an exercise of eminent domain. 
171. Arastra. 401 F. SUDD. at 979. 
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Circumstantial review is not the same thing as the "contin-
uum approach",172 which finds a regulation a taking when it goes 
"too far".173 Instead, it broadens the taking inquiry beyond the 
regulation and extends it to the impact of the regulation on the 
particular piece of property and the entire course of the govern-
ment's conductl74 in light of community conditions1711 and envi-
ronmental factors.178 It should also incorporate the factors bal-
anced in the Penn Central case: the economic impact on the 
property owner and the importance of the state's interest. 177 The 
circumstantial standard is already recognized in mlmy of the 
federal taking cases,178 and has been applied in state cases as 
well. 179 A comparison of three cases illustrates the advantages of 
using the circumstantial review standard. In Aruerne Bay Con-
struction Company u. Thatcher,180 the owner of residenth~lly 
zoned property applied for a variance to build a gas station. His 
application denied, he sued for a taking.181 The court found that 
the ordinance effected a taking because the property was wholly 
unfit for residential use: an open sewer was located 1200' from 
172. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
173. [d. 
174. Comment, supra note 83, at 733. 
175. See Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 
(1938), in which the owner of land zoned residential applied for a variance for a gas 
station. The owner and the City's experts agreed that the property couldn't be profitably 
. used for residential purposes: there was no residential pressure in plaintiff's area and 
would be none for the foreseeable future. Denied a variance, the owner challenged the 
ordinance and the court invalidated it on the basis that an ordinance which so impacts 
property that it can't be used for any reasonable purpose was a taking. 
176. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). In 
MacDonald, the plaintiff's land was zoned Agricultural Preserve after he applied for ap-
proval of a subdivision map. However, since a foot of topsoil had been removed to build 
nearby Interstate 80, and since the land was infested with pests, it was clearly unsuitable 
for agricultural uses. Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of 
Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015). 
177. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
178. "Ad hoc factual inquiry" - MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Co., 476 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 
U.S. 621, 649 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. "Question 
turning upon the particular circumstances of each case" - United States v. Central Eu-
reka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). 
179. See Arverne, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587. See also Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. 
City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. 
Cal. 1976), and Morris County Land Inv. Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp., 40 N.J. 539, 
193 A.2d 232 (1963). In both cases, the courts found takings based on the entire course of 
the government's conduct, not merely on the basis of the regulation in question. 
180. 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938). 
181. [d. at 225, 15 N.E.2d at 589. 
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the property line and the City's incinerator had been built 
nearby.182 On-site conditions were not likely to change enough in 
the future to allow the plaintiff to put the land to profitable 
use. 18S Had the effect of the regulation in light of on-site condi-
tions amounted only to a temporary inconvenience, the court 
would have been less willing to find a taking.184 
In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,1811 the 
Town of Golden adopted an ordinance which potentially stalled 
development for 18 years. Although the ordinance was attacked 
on due process grounds,186 the court sustained it because, unlike 
Arverne's, it did not permanently restrict development:187 it al-
lowed acceleration of development by owners who were willing 
to install capital improvements such as sewer and water and re-
duced property taxes during the effective period of the 
ordinance.188 
The results in jurisdictions which do not use circumstantial 
review can be harsh. California, for example, continues to insist 
that an exercise of the police power can never effect a taking.189 
In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,190 a recent 
California case, the owner of a 44-acre parcel located in Yolo 
County applied to the County for a subdivision map. The 
County denied the application because the property lacked 
sewer and water services, had no street access and insufficient 
fire and police protection!91 However, these deficiencies were at-
tributable to government action. The nearby City of Davis had 
redrawn its street maps to isolate the land and refused dedica-
tion of streets the owner agreed to build himself. The County 
refused to supply sewer services,192 and delivered the final blow 
when it determined that the land could be used only for agricul-
182. [d. at 230, 15 N.E.2d at 591. 
183. [d. at 232, 15 N.E.2d at 592. 
184. [d. 
185. 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). 
186. [d. at 369, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 144, 285 N.E.2d at 296. 
187. [d. at 382, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155, 285 N.E.2d at 304. 
188. [d. 
189. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 598 P.2d 25 (1979). 
190. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
191. Appellant's Brief at 7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. 
Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015). 
192. [d. at 6. 
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tural purposes.19S In light of the fact that a foot of topsoil had 
been stripped from the land and it was infested with ineradica-
ble pests, it was clearly unusable for agricultural purposes.194 
The lower courts found the plaintiff's factual allegations inade-
quate to state a taking. They went on to hold that, regardless of 
such insufficiency, money damages for inverse condemnation 
were foreclosed as a matter of California law.1911 The United 
States Supreme Court refused to overturn the state decision be-
cause the plaintiff had not exhausted all administrative reme-
dies. 196 Had any of the courts applied the circumstantial review 
standard, the result might have been less harsh. 
C. THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT 
Judicial relief from a regulatory act is not available until the 
prescribed administrative remedies have been exhausted,197 and 
a final administrative decision obtained.198 The absence of a fi-
nal administrative decision has been fatal in almost all of the 
major Supreme Court taking cases in the land use area.199 The 
last two major cases, Williamson Planning Commission v. Ham-
ilton Bank200 and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of 
193. Id. at 7. 
194. Id. at 6·7. 
195. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2564 (1986). 
196. Id. at 2567-68. 
197. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding, 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). 
198. Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 283, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160 
(1980). See cases cited infra note 199. 
199. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633 (1981) (The 
Supreme Court rejected jurisdiction, holding that there was no final decision in the lower 
court as to whether the regulation in question had effected a taking); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 262-63 (1980) (Plaintiffs failed to submit a specific develop-
ment plan, with the result that the Court found there was "as yet no concrete contro-
versy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions"); Penn Central Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37 (1978) (Plaintiff's failure to submit an appli-
cation for a smaller structure resulted in Court's inability to determine whether all rights 
to use airspace above the terminal were denied). See also MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 
2568-69 (1986) (Plaintiff had received county's response to one subdivision proposal, but 
had yet to receive final position regarding application of regulation to his land); William-
son Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117-18 (1985) (Plaintiff failed 
to seek variances which would have removed five of the County's eight objections to its 
submitted plat). 
200. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985). 
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Yolo201 make it clear that the need for a final administrative 
decision has now become part of the taking formula. 202 
Although some critics charge that the courts are using the 
exhaustion requirement to avoid finding takings,203 there are le-
gitimate reasons for insisting on finality. Until an owner has the 
final application of a regulation to his property, it is impossible 
to tell whether the land retains any reasonable beneficial use.20' 
The requirement may help clarify whether the government in-
tends to appropriate.2011 The intimidation of zoning and planning 
personnel by the prospect of taking awards,206 and the financial 
burden on cities of paying for regulatory acts 207 are frequently 
cited as reasons for requiring finality in a land use context.208 
Government may not always be aware that a regulation takes 
property; forcing an owner to exhaust administrative remedies 
allows government to foresee a taking and to plan for it 
financially.209 
201. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
202. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2566; Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3117. 
203. Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HAST. L.Q. 491, 513 
n.72 (1981). 
204. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3121. 
205. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 n.27 (5th Cir. 1981). 
The Hernandez court felt that the government should be given a chance to review any 
legislation whose application to particular land constituted a prima facie taking. Other 
authorities agree. See Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use 
Control Cases, Part 1, 4 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REPT. 129, 134·35 (1981). 
206. It seems a usurpation of legislative power for a court to force compensation. 
Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 377 (1979). See 
Johnson, supra note 130; Johnson feels that, due to the huge amount of zoned land, 
requiring compensation for all zoning losses would remove land use regulation from the 
scope of the police power. She notes courts are traditionally reluctant to act as super 
zoning commissions. Contrast Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 751, who reject the 
idea that government officials will be "sandbagged", and who note that land use deci· 
sions "are the product of study and public hearings." See also Comment, supra note 83, 
at 726·32; the author feels that fears of fiscal disaster may indicate that planners know 
they are exceeding constitutional limits. Id. at 727. See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting): "After all, if a 
policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" 
207. See Michelman, supra note 101. He feels a stringent compensation requirement 
will raise social costs and force abandonment of important projects. Id. at 1222. See also 
Comment, supra note 83, at 726·28. The Supreme Court rejected the fiscal disaster sce· 
nario in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980). See also Hagman, 
supra note 205. Hagman also rejects the fiscal argument. He feels that if requiring com· 
pensation would impose staggering losses on cities, it is only because developers are al· 
ready bearing staggering losses. Id. at 133. 
208. Comment, supra note 83, at 726·32. 
209. Id. at 731; Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981); 
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Insisting on exhaustion also reduces the burden on the 
courts,210 provides for the resolution of issues by agencies which 
are familiar with local conditions21l and prevents the courts from 
interfering unnecessarily in local land use decisions.212 The final-
ity requirement avoids the constitutional resolution of issues 
which can be otherwise disposed of.213 The failure to obtain a 
final determination of permitted use may amount to a facial at-
tack on an ordinance. Courts are reluctant to deal with the facial 
constitutionality of a regulation,214 since such adjudication often 
involves separation of powers problems. Requiring that adminis-
trative remedies be exhausted prevents such facial attacks. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to know when a land use decision 
is final. Regulations are seldom "final", since variances, rezon-
ings and conditional uses are often available.2lIi Rejected devel-
opment plans can be revised and resubmitted.216 Since local 
government often reacts inconsistently, initial action on develop-
ment proposals seldom reliably predicts future responses.217 The 
result is a developer under siege.218 The exhaustion requirement 
"leaves the landowner vulnerable to a bewildering series of mul-
tiple-agency restrictions, buck-passing and dilatory vacilla-
tion".219 Prince George's County v. Blumberg220 is a classic ex-
Hagman, supra note 205, at 134. 
210. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 522 (1977); Prince George's County v. 
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 284, 418 A.2d 1155, 1160-61 (1980). 
211. Moore, 431 U.S. at 524; Prince George's, 288 Md. at 284, 418 A.2d at 1160. 
212. Moore, 431 U.S. at 525; Prince George's, 288 Md. at 284, 418 A.2d at 1160-61. 
See generally supra note 206. 
213. Moore, 431 U.S. at 525, 526. 
214. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
215. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134; Comment, supra note 83, at 733. See Mac-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2571 (1986) (regulatory 
decisions are an ongoing process). 
216. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978). 
217. See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117-18 
(1985). Although the developer's project was unable to meet ordinance requirements in 
at least eight areas, no matter what plan was submitted, the Court felt the owner should 
have sought variances which would have resolved at least five of the objections. Un-
resolved, of course, was whether any plan would be approved if the remaining three ob-
jections were not removed. 
218. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 697. The authors compare a developer to 
a wagon train headed West at which desperados and Indians take potshots with 
impunity. 
219. Comment, supra note 83, at 733; see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (property owner was entangled in a multi-agency 
web woven by the City of Davis and Yolo County), and Prince George's County v. 
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ample. Days before the plaintiff began construction on a high 
rise, he learned that the County intended to revoke his building 
permit. A law passed after its issuance required that he have a 
contractor's license. 221 Plaintiff applied for a license but began 
construction while its issuance was pending since he had to have 
footings in within six months in order to maintain his sewer per-
mit.222 Because he had no license, the County issued a stop no-
tice. It also advised the sewer district that the building permit 
had been revoked. Predictably, the sewer district withdrew the 
sewer permit. The County then advised the owner it would not 
reissue a building permit until the sewer permit was rein-
stated.223 The County Board of Appeals had jurisdiction over the 
building permit,224 but none over the sewer permit. The owner 
charged that his administrative remedies were inadequate, and 
sued for injunctive relief.m The court denied relief,226 and held 
that he was required to separately exhaust the remedies of each 
agency.227 
There are some exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. 
Exhaustion of legislative remedies is not required.228 An owner 
need not exhaust his remedies if a governmental body lacks au-
thority to grant relief, if relief would be inadequate, if the ad-
ministrative body has demonstrated hostility and the owner's 
petition would be futile or if irreparable harm would occur dur-
ing the delay.229 Requiring a landowner to run the gauntlet of 
repeated applications and denials in order to pinpoint local gov-
ernment's definitive position is not always necessary.230 Govern-
Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980). 
220. 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980) .. 
221. [d. at 279, 418 A.2d at 1158. 
222. [d. 
223. [d. 
224. [d. at 289, 418 A.2d at 1163. 
225. Id. at 281-82, 418 A.2d at 1159. 
226. Id. at 292-94, 418 A.2d at 1165. 
227. Id. 
228. Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San Di-
ego, 57 IND. L.J. 45, 57 (1982); see also Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). 
229. See Kmiec, supra note 228, at 58; see generally Comment, Exhausting Admin-
istrative and Legislative Remedies in Zoning Cases, 48 TULANE L. REV. 665, 667-73 
(1974), and City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 137, 610 P.2d 436, 444, 
164 Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (1980). 
230. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2571 (1986). 
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ment's position can be determined by analyzing factors other 
than its actual decision on a given application.231 
There should also be an exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement when unfair state procedural rules regarding exhaus-
tion violate the Supremacy Clause.232 State courts decide, based 
on state procedural rules, whether an owner has exhausted his 
administrative remedies. Because a federal taking claim cannot 
arise unless such remedies have been exhausted,233 state courts 
are frequently the arbiters of whether the taking issue is "ripe" 
or justiciable. However, whether a federal question exists is a 
matter to be determined by federal, not state, courts,234 since 
preclusion of federal review on state procedural grounds jeopar-
dizes important federal rights.23Ii A state's determination that 
administrative procedures have not been exhausted should not 
preclude review of the taking issue, a federal question, unless 
the federal courts find state procedural rules fair.236 
Although a landowner's taking claim is not premature if it is 
clear that the local government will not revoke an unconstitu-
tional regulation,237 it is dangerous for a landowner to unilater-
ally decide that seeking relief would be futile. The courts may 
well determine, in the exercise of judicial hindsight, that it is not 
at all clear that such a petition would have been futile.236 This 
231. [d. 
232. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides: "This Constitution ... 
shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any Thing ... in the Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." 
233. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an essential legal element of a taking 
claim. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986); 
Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3117 (1985). 
234. L. TRIBE, supra note 162, §3-33, at 123 (1978). 
235. [d. 
236. The Supreme Court is generally zealous in scrutinizing state court procedures 
for fairness. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Kremer v. 
Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 
(1980). 
237. City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d 123, 137, 610 P.2d 436, 444, 164 
Cal. Rptr. 539, 547 (1980). See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). In 
Moore, the plaintiff attacked an ordinance which permitted only immediate blood rela-
tives to occupy a residential dwelling, and which prohibited her grandsons from living 
with her. The Court held Cleveland's variance procedure irrelevant since the ordinance 
was facially unconstitutional on due process grounds (abridging the right of related fam-
ily members was outside the scope of a legitimate exercise of the police power) and be-
cause there was no basis for inferring that the plaintiff would have gotten the variance. 
[d. at 511-12. 
238. See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); 
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risk can be eliminated without forcing the owner to jump 
through endless regulatory hoops. A solution was suggested in 
Hernandez v. Lafayette.239 
In Hernandez, the City of Lafayette refused to rezone the 
plaintiffs property from single family to multiple density or of-
fice. The plaintiff charged that the City refused in order to de-
press land values pending an eminent domain proceeding 
designed to take part of the land for a road.240 The Fifth Circuit 
Court held that a regulatory taking did not occur until the mu-
nicipality's governing body was given a "realistic opportunity 
and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation 
vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the inequity".241 
In a footnote, the court alluded to a procedure that could be 
utilized to give the city that opportunity-an owner's petition 
for rezoning.242 The idea has been endorsed by legal scholars.243 
Regulated by state statutes, it would resolve the question of 
whether seeking further administrative remedies would be futile. 
Government's non-response to the petition could be deemed a 
final administrative decision and an expression of intent to 
take.244 
The petition procedure would also resolve some of the sepa-
ration of power and fiscal objections to the concept of regulatory 
takings. In Ventures in Property Investm~nt Company v. City 
of Wichita,2411 a property owner obtained tentative approval of a 
plat map. Permanent approval was withheld until the City of 
Wichita decided on the location of a highway corridor. After 
waiting for the determination for four years, the plaintiff sued.246 
see also Zoning, AMERICAN LAWYER, 112 (1986), a comment on the MacDonald case, 
describing 110ward Ellman's assert.ion, in oral argument before the Supreme Court, that 
application for review of a less intensive subdivision plan would have been "futile". The 
assertion was rejected by a majority of the Court, and turned out to be the fatal weak-
ness in the case. See also Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 
1155 (1980). 
239. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981). 
240. Id. at 1191. 
241. Id. at 1200. 
242. Id. at 1200 n.27. 
243. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134-35. Hagman feels that even a formal letter 
should be sufficient. Id. at 134. See also Kmiec, supra note 228, at 61-63. 
244. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134. 
245. 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671 (1979). 
246. Id. at 699-701, 594 P.2d at 675. 
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The trial court found that the City had effected a taking.247 The 
higher court reversed and ordered the City to approve the plain-
tiff's final map or condemn his property within six months. Fail-
ing either, judgment would be entered against the City, which 
would be liable for damages.248 This amount of direct involve-
ment by the courts in legislative affairs makes them "superzon-
ing commissions",249 involved in both land use and appropria-
tions decisions. The petition procedure would reduce the courts' 
impact on both. Government, on receipt of the petition, is given 
notice that it has taken. Unless it chooses to contest, it can then 
rescind, modify or compensate. The courts are not involved. The 
matter remains in the administrative arena.250 
The objection that local governments often "take" unwit-
tingly would be irrelevant. For example, the owner in Her-
nandez could have delivered a petition to the Lafayette City 
Council, advising it that he considered the Council's refusal to 
rezone a regulatory taking. Lack of response within a statutorily 
defined period would have been deemed, at law, to constitute a 
final administrative decision. The owner would not be required 
to exhaust further administrative remedies before seeking judi-
cial review. 
The petition procedure presents some problems. The land-
owner, rather than the courts, becomes the initial arbiter of a 
taking. If he decides his land has been taken and petitions for a 
rezoning, he may intimidate local government into administra-
tive relief to which he is not entitled. The extent to which the 
petition procedure intimidates decisionmaking will depend on 
local government's willingness to "stonewall it", and force the 
owner into the courts. Overall, the petition will help determine 
whether there has been a per se exhaustion of remedies and will 
also eliminate one of the greatest escape hatches through which 
the federal courts retreat to avoid finding a taking.251 
247. [d. 
248. [d. at 714, 594 P.2d at 683. 
249. Johnson, supra note 130, at 601. Johnson notes that federal courts, at least, are 
traditionally reluctant to act as super-zoning commissions. 
250. Hagman, supra note 205, at 134. Hagman feels that formal suit should not be 
necessary. 
251. See generally supra, note 171. The other major escape hatch appears to be 
abstention. See Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 694-95. 
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III. INV ALIDATION ALONE IS AN INSUFFICIENT 
REMEDY 
Bare invalidation of an oppressive regulation is not a suffi-
cient remedy.2t12 Invalidation prevents future loss of use, but it 
does not compensate a landowner for losses sustained during the 
lifetime of the regulation. 2113 Because it is almost impossible to 
invalidate a course of conduct,2t14 it places him on a regulatory 
merry-go-round,2t1t1 and encourages planners to throw the bur-
dens of progress on a few individuals:2t16 invalidation of a regula-
tion is "inexpensive" compared to the just compensation re-
quired in eminent domain. Such uneven distribution of 
regulatory burdens is contrary to the spirit of the Fifth Amend- . 
ment, which restrains government from forcing individuals to 
bear burdens which should be borne by the public.2t17 Invalida-
tion is a due process remedy. Since a regulation can effect a tak-
ing without violating due process standards, injunctive relief 
may not always be available. 
Prior to Pennsylvania Coal,2t18 invalidation was the only 
remedy available for excessive regulation. Some state courts con-
tinue to apply it exclusively in land use cases.2tlD A few legal 
scholars maintain that invalidation should be the exclusive rem-
edy on a public policy basis: they argue that the importance of 
the public interest in land use cases justifies "asymmetrical 
252. See generally Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 731-38, and Corrigan v. 
City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR, slip op. at 11, 12 (Ariz., June 2, 1986): "Without a 
damages remedy, invalidation alone is a toothless tiger." 
253. Hagman, supra note 205, at 130; Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 732. 
254. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 737. 
255. Comment, supra note 83, at 733. See also Justice Brennan's footnote in San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1980), reciting the 
jaded comments of a city attorney, and Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 734: 
"[T)he supposedly victorious owner, who has succeeded in having a court invalidate an 
unconstitutional regulation, finds that his reward is an invitation to become a yo-yo." 
256. Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981). 
257. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Sax, supra 
note 74, at 55-58, which discusses the purpose of the fifth amendment as being protec-
tion of the individual from arbitrary and tyrannical acts of government. Under this view 
of the fifth, the amendment was intended as a bulwark against governmental unfairness, 
not against diminution of value. Accord L. TRIBE, supra note 162, §9-4, at 463 (1978). 
258. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
259. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 272-73, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 
375 (1979); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 
350 N.E.2d 381, 386-87 (1976). 
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remedies".26o Others insist that invalidation relieves any finan-
cial detriment to the owner.261 
The judicial trend at the federal and state level is to ac-
knowledge that invalidation alone is not an adequate remedy.262 
There is recognition of the fact that invalidation does not com-
pensate the owner for his full economic 10ss.263 At the federal 
level, dissents in two major cases appear to agree that states 
cannot limit a landowner's remedies to injunctive or declaratory 
relief.264 They insist that rescission of a regulation does not re-
move the taking. 2611 Justice Brennan stated in San Diego Gas & 
Electric Company v. City of San Diego that the Just Compensa-
tion Clause is not "precatory" and the Fifth Amendment provi-
sion regarding just compensation "self-executing".266 Justice 
260. Mandelker, supra note 203, at 498. Mandelker argues that the normal remedial 
hierarchy should be skewed in land use cases: the normal preference for damages which 
awards injunctive relief only if damages are inadequate is not operative in such cases. Id. 
at 491-92. He feels this asymmetry is due to the importance of the public interest at 
stake, and refers to the airplane overflight cases as examples of the courts' tolerance of 
asymmetry in regulation cases: the overflight cases award only legal, not equitable, relief. 
[d. at 497, 504. 
261. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. Johnson argues that after invalidation, the 
economic impact of the regulation is typically small in relation to the total value of the 
land, and that the magnitude of the loss is therefore not sufficient to constitute a taking. 
Id. at 595. She also argues that it is unfair to compensate a landowner burdened by an 
unconstitutional regulation but not to compensate one who is burdened by a constitu-
tional one, as in the case of development moratoriums imposed while regulations are 
adopted. Id. at 595. For a good response to her insistence that invalidation removes most 
of the economic harm, see Comment, supra note 83, at 740-45, and especially the au-
thor's analysis of Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 228 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 
(1980). 
262. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981), 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. 
Ct. 3108, 3124-25 (1985), (Brennan, J., concurring); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 
590, 599-600, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 
(5th Cir. 1980). 
263. Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25; San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 655 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
264. MacDonald, Sommer &. Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653-57, (Brennan, J., dissenting}/But 
see the majority opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), which declined 
to consider whether a state could limit the remedies available to a person whose land had 
been taken without just compensation. Id. at 263. 
265. MacDonald, 106 S. Ct. at 2574 (White, J., dissenting); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. 
at 657, (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argues that "Nothing in the Just Com-
pensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable. Nor does 
the temporary reversible quality of a regulatory 'taking' render compensation for the 
time of the 'taking' any less obligatory." Id. at 657. 
266. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 654, (Brennan, J. dissenting). See also 6 NICHOLS, 
31
Savery: Regulatory Taking
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
228 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:197 
White declared in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates u. County of 
Yolo267 that rescission of a regulation does not reverse a taking, 
and that the Constitution requires that just compensation be 
paid for a temporary taking.266 Furthermore, if the police power 
and the power of eminent domain are coterminus,269 a regulation 
which promotes a legitimate police power objective is entitled to 
the same judicial deference as an exercise of eminent domain.270 
The scope of review of public purpose is "extremely narrow".271 
It seems anomalous to allow a legislature to insist on deference 
in order to sustain a regulation and yet allow it to suddenly 
claim the regulation should be invalidated if the courts find a 
taking.272 The Supreme Court barred such self-serving games-
manship in eminent domain cases, holding in Ruckelshaus u. 
Monsanto Company273 that "[e]quitable relief is not available to 
enjoin an alleged taking of private property for public use, duly 
authorized by law, where a suit for compensation can be brought 
against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."274 Since emi-
nent domain and the police power are coterminus, government 
should not be able to play switch and bait games with equitable 
remedies in regulatory taking cases. 
Whether, in a given situation, government has the right to 
regulate and whether such regulation takes property are sepa-
rate issues.2711 A regulation may survive due process scrutiny but 
still effect a taking for which compensation is required. 276 In EL-
dridge u. City of Palo Alto,277 the property owner sued for a 
supra note 1, §25.41, and United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980). 
267. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
268. Id. at 2574 (White, J., dissenting). 
269. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 476 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
270. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 705-06. 
271. Berman v. Parker, 438 U.S. 26,32 (1954). Accord Hawaii Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. 
at 240-41. 
272. Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, at 706. 
273. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
274. [d. at 1016. 
275. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979). Accord Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425 (1982); United States v. Secur-
ity Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 74 (1982). See generally Berger and Kanner, supra note 26, 
at 728-31. 
276. Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 
(1976), uacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). See 
also Wright, Damages or Compensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37 
ARK. L. REV. 612, 619 (1984). See generally supra note 275. 
277. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976), uacated 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 
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taking on the basis of an open space ordinance he conceded was 
valid.278 The California Court of Appeals agreed that the ordi-
nance did not violate due process standards, but held that its 
validity did not immunize it from a taking challenge.279 Since 
there is no necessary relationship between an ordinance's valid-
ity under a Fourteenth Amendment due process test and its con-
stitutionality under a Fifth Amendment taking test, insisting on 
invalidation, a due process remedy, as the only remedy for an 
excessive regulation280 is wholly without merit. 
IV. CALCULATION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE 
REGULATORY TAKING IS POSSIBLE 
Assuming the payment of compensation is not precatory but 
mandatory,281 a major problem remains: calculating that com-
pensation.282 The principles used for calculating just compensa-
tion in eminent domain cases provide a basis for its calculation 
in regulatory cases. However, the formula should reflect the tem-
porary nature of the regulatory taking, and the fact that an 
owner is not entitled to all possible uses of his property. In addi-
tion, the regulatory formula should minimize the balance of 
power problems inherent in court-ordered compensation for leg-
islative acts. 
A. THE EMINENT DOMAIN STANDARD 
In eminent domain cases, the government is required to pay 
the landowner the full fair market value of the interest taken.283 
In order to be "just" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, such 
P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). 
278. [d. at 617, 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 577, 579. 
279. [d. at 632, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 586. 
280. Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 
(1979). 
281. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Bren· 
nan, J., dissenting). See Bauman, supra note 26, at 95 for an explanation of Justice 
Brennan's '''non-precatory'' language. 
282. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986); 
Hagman, supra note 56, at 6. 
283. 4 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §12.1. Fair market value is "the price agreed to by an 
informed seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, and an informed buyer who is 
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compensation should be the full and perfect equivalent in 
money of the property taken.284 An owner is to be placed in as 
good a position, pecuniarily, as he would have been in had the 
property not been taken.286 The fair market standard is geared 
to compensating the owner not just for the existing use, but for 
its best and highest use under existing zoning. 286 If only part of 
an owner's land is taken, and the partial taking reduces the 
value of the remaining property, an owner is entitled to compen-
sation for the diminished value. 287 If the value of his remaining 
land is enhanced by the condemnation, the government is al-
lowed to deduct that from his award.288 
An eminent domain award is based on the value of property 
alone. It does not take the individual circumstances of the owner 
or the state of his business into consideration.289 While all the 
other clauses in the Fifth Amendment are personal, the Just 
Compensation Clause is not: its emphasis is on property alone.29o 
As a result,special idiosyncratic value and consequential dam-
ages are usually ignored in calculating just compensation.291 
The market standard may not be used when it is too diffi-
cult to ascertain value. Another standard may be adopted if the 
use of market value would be unjust to the owner or to the pub-
lic.292 Deviation from the market standard requires unusual cir-
cumstances such as a controlled market.293 
284. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
285. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943). 
286. L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1936); see Cos-
tonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45, for a critique of the best and highest use standard. 
287. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); see also infra note 278. 
288. Bauman, 167 U.S. 548. 
289. [d. at 580. 
290. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
291. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943). See also 
infra note 323. 
292. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). This 
case involved a government requisition of black pepper in a controlled World War II 
market. The plaintiff asked for a fair market price which the court rejected, saying that 
fair market value was not always an appropriate standard, and was clearly inappropriate 
in a controlled market. [d. at 122-23, 130. 
293. [d. In the Commodities Trading case, the Office of Price Administration had 
established a ceiling price on pepper. The plaintiff sought an uncontrolled fair market 
value for its pepper, but the court held the ceiling price was the proper measure of just 
compensation. [d. at 130. 
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B. ApPLYING THE EMINENT DOMAIN STANDARD TO REGULATORY 
TAKINGS 
Justice Brennan agreed in San Diego Gas that eminent do-
main standards of just compensation were adequate in regula-
tory cases.294 There are reasons to object to their use. Condem-
nation results in the permanent transfer of the fee; regulations 
do not.29Ii Regulations seldom have any permanent effect.296 Zon-
ing decisions may distribute use rights unevenly,297 but property 
owners do not have vested rights in any given zoning.296 Strictly 
applying the eminent domain standard for just compensation 
would require local government to pay for a use it created. For 
example, in the MacDonald case,299 Yolo County zoned the 
plaintiff's land for residential use,300 then later decided it was 
appropriate only for agricultural use. SOl If the County had con-
demned the land instead of downzoning it, it would have had to 
compensate the owner for the best and highest use of the land 
under the residential zoning. The reduction of use from residen-
tial to agricultural was not, in and of itself, a taking. The owner 
was not entitled to residential use, only to some beneficial use. 
The taking occurred because no use was possible under the agri-
cultural designation. An award of compensation based on the 
residential zoning would have been a windfall to the owner. 
Eminent domain compensation standards can be adapted to 
regulatory taking cases. Such adaptations should discriminate 
between permanent and temporary takings and between reduc-
tion versus deprivation of use. 
294. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621, 658-59 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
295. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887). See Arverne Bay Construction 
Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222. 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 592 (1938), which noted that an op-
pressive regulation left the owner with little more than the obligation to pay taxes. 
296. Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 
(1972). 
297. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1027. 
298. Johnson. supra note 130, at 566. 
299. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
300. Appellant's Brief at 4, MacDonald. Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. 
Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015). 
301. Id. at 7. 
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1. Permanent versus interim damages 
If a regulation permanently takes property, use of the emi-
nent domain standard is appropriate. It is also appropriate 
where a court orders acquisition of land rather than invalidating 
an ordinance.302 Where government refuses to recede from a reg-
ulation,303 permanent damages are appropriate because there is 
a de facto condemnation. In most taking cases, an owner asks 
only for interim damages, or for interim damages and invalida-
tion.304 Permanent damages are seldom awarded when a regula-
tion is rescinded.30I! They seem unwarranted in such cases,308 un-
less temporary application of the regulation permanently de-
stroys use or value.307 
There is resistance to interim damages.308 Such damages 
might chill the legislative function309 by increasing the occasions 
on which government would be forced to pay for the right to 
regulate. Protecting the public welfare would be more expensive. 
302. Ventures in Property Inv. v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 695, 594 P.2d 671 
(1979). The court ordered the City of Wichita to either approve plaintiffs development 
or to condemn the property, and gave it six months to decide. [d. at 714, 594 P.2d at 683. 
There are clear separation of power problems involved in such court orders, since the 
court becomes in effect a zoning commission. Contrast Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184 
N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982), where the court refused to order condemnation, hold· 
ing such an order should be issued only where acquisition seemed inevitable. [d. at 61·62, 
445 A.2d at 73. See also Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F.Supp. 962 
(N.D. Cal. 1972), uacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976): the court ordered the City 
of Palo Alto to pay for the value of the fee as of the date the open space regulation was 
passed and plaintiff was ordered to convey title on receipt of payment. [d. at 983. 
303. See Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 
(1976). Eldridge was disapproved by the California Supreme Court in Agins v. Tiburon, 
24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979). In Eldridge the 
plaintiff conceded the validity of the open space ordinance. [d. at 617, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 
577. 
304. Johnson, supra note 130, at 590; see City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 
390 (Tex. 1978); Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 271·72, 598 P.2d at 27, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 374. 
305. But see Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
391 (1969), where the court did award permanent damages despite rescission of the 
County's regulations. 
306. Johnson, supra note 130 at 592. 
307. Benenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
308. Hagman, supra note 205, at 130·32; Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. 
309. Johnson, supra note 130, at 593·95. But see Hagman, supra note 205, at 133, 
who rejects the chill argument. Johnson feels that while interim damages exert less chill 
than permanent, they will still sway legislative bodies to vote in favor of developers. 
Johnson at 594. See also Michelman, supra note 101, at 1222; he feels that the award of 
temporary damages will force legislators to abandon worthwhile projects. 
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Damages must be certain,3lO and interim damages are difficult to 
prove.311 Some argue that no damages exist in temporary takings 
at all.312 No compensation is awarded, for example, when local 
government places a temporary moratorium on development in 
order to revise regulations or to prevent development from over-
whelming public services.313 Despite these considerations, there 
are strong indications that a majority of the Supreme Court Jus-
tices would require the payment of just compensation for tempo-
rary takings.314 
There is precedent for interim damages in "pure" eminent 
domain cases involving short term condemnations. Such con-
demnations were frequent during World War II, and several 
cases dealing with valuation of temporary takings reached the 
Supreme Court.315 In United States u. General Motors Corpora-
tion,316 the federal government temporarily condemned a Chi-
cago warehouse under the War Powers Act. The plaintiff re-
tained the reversionary rights in a long term lease which the 
condemnation interrupted.317 The Supreme Court held that the 
310. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.s. I, 20 (1948); Sheerr v. Eve-
sham Township 184 N.J. Super. 11,54,65,445 A.2d 46, 69, 75 (1982). See City of Austin 
v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389, 394-95 (Tex. 1978), where the owner was able to establish a 
taking but not allowed to recover compensation because he didn't prove loss with reason-
able certainty. 
311. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595-96. 
312. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. 
313. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. Development moratoriums imposed in order 
to allow a jurisdiction to adopt regulatory guidelines are usually upheld against both due 
process and taking challenges. See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 
N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972); contrast Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of 
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 934 (1976). 
314. Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San 
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). In San Diego Gas, 
Justice Brennan's dissent was joined by three other Justices - Stewart, Marshall and 
Powell; Justice Rehnquist, who wrote a concurring opinion, agreed in principle with Jus-
tice Brennan, but felt no final judgment had been entered in the lower court. [d. at 633-
34, 636. Justice Brennan reiterated his position in Williamson, and was joined by a sixth 
Justice, Justice White, in the MacDonald case. See Williamson, 105 S. Ct. at 3124-25, 
and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986) 
(White, J., dissenting). Two-thirds of the United States Supreme Court now find interim 
takings compensable. The retirement of Chief Justice Burger should not affect the 
Court's posture on this issue. 
315. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. 
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373 (1945). 
316. 323 U.S. 373 (1945). 
317. [d. at 375. 
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plaintiff could recover the value of the lease for the duration of 
the taking. It also allowed the recovery of limited consequential 
damages because the taking interrupted the plaintiff's 
tenancy.3lS 
Despite a judicial trend which favors compensation for the 
temporary taking, the standards for valuing such compensation 
are far from clear.319 As Justice Rehnquist noted in his concur-
rence in MacDonald,320 "the questions surrounding what com-
pensation, if any, is due a property owner in the context of 'in-
terim' takings are multifaceted and difficult".321 Justice Brennan 
declared in San Diego Gas that the reversible quality of a tem-
porary taking makes just compensation no less obligatory.322 
State and lower federal courts have awarded interim damages 
before323 and after324 the San Diego Gas decision. However, 
there is no consensus on valuation criteria. 
2. Rejection of consequential damages 
The focus in eminent domain is not on making the owner 
whole, but on compensating him for his property 10ss.3211 It is not 
a tort to govern,326 but some legal scholars feel that there is 
enough difference between eminent domain and regulation to 
justify including some consequential damages in the compensa-
tion formula for regulatory takings.327 
318. [d. at 378, 383. 
319. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2574 (1986), 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hagman, supra note 56, at 6. 
320. MacDonald 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
321. [d. at 2574. 
322. San Diego Gas. & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981), 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
323. See, e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728-29 
(D. N.J. 1976). The court, reviewing the granting of a motion to dismiss, only "discussed" 
the appropriateness of temporary damages in regulatory cases, based on the cases cited 
supra note 315. 
324. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983); Sheerr v. Evesham 
Township, 184 N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982). 
325. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. I, 5 (1949); United States v. 
General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 
373 (1943); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893). 
326. Hagman, supra note 205, at 133. 
327. Wright, supra note 276, at 639; General Motors, 323 U.S. at 383. 
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Divergent attitudes toward the purpose of compensation 
produce a lack of consensus regarding recovery of non-property 
losses. Justice Brennan argued in San Diego Gas that compensa-
tion should redistribute the economic cost of regulation from the 
individual to the public at large.328 Redistributive compensation 
would cover economic loss beyond mere property value.329 The 
principal objection to this approach is that it redistributes only 
losses, not gains. Although an owner can be selectively favored 
by regulations, his gains are not redistributed. He is not re-
quired to pay the government back for his special advantages. 
Some feel that since an owner doesn't have to pay for regulatory 
advantages, government shouldn't have to pay him when he is 
disadvantaged.330 
Others urge that compensation should be paid only if 
government is acting in an enterprise capacity, but not when it 
acts as an arbitrator, resolving conflicts between uses. 331 Spur 
Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Company332 is a 
classic "arbitral" case. In Del Webb, residential development en-
croached on a pre-existing stockyard. When residents com-
plained about odors and health hazards, the City closed the 
stockyard, but forced the developer to compensate the stockyard 
328. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981), 
(Brennann, J., dissenting). The "redistribution of regulatory burden" theme is echoed in 
a number of cases. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82·83 
(1980); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). 
329. See Justice Brennan's comments in San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 657: "The pay-
ment of just compensation serves to place the landowner in the same position monetarily 
as he would have occupied if his property had not been taken." Justice Brennan contem-
plates damages beyond mere property value, since he cites United States v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). San Diego Gas at 659. General Motors involved the 
government's condemnation of a long term lease. The Court noted that while market 
value was ordinarily the proper measure of compensation, it was sometimes an inappro· 
priate measure. [d. at 379-80. It distinguished between the taking of a permanent fee and 
the taking of a temporary right to occupy and awarded consequential damages, arguing 
that bare market value would be "confiscation", not "compensation". [d. at 380-81. 
330. Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. 
331. Sax, supra note 74, at 62·75. See also Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New 
York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 593, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, 350 N.E.2d 381, 384 (1976), where the court 
applied Sax' arbitral/enterprise distinction. Although Sax coined the phrase, the distinc-
tion grows out of the treatment of the police power -in nuisance cases. Abatement of a 
nuisance - an "arbitral" act· is not a compensable taking. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U.S. 394 (1915). 
332. 108 Ariz. 178,494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
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owner. In Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto,333 the City of Palo Alto 
acted as a market participant, acquiring open space by regula-
tion. The arbitral/enterprise distinction is based on writings 
completed before and during the drafting of the Fifth Amend-
ment. SS4 These writings emphasize the need to protect landown-
ers against unfairness, not against value diminution.336 However, 
since arbitral/enterprise theorists see property as economic value 
defined by the process of competition,336 "activity" value as well 
as "land" value is compensable. 
A third approach, the "fairness" approach, emphasizes 
"equalization" of the burdens of regulation.337 Under the redis-
tributive view, the individual's full regulatory losses are shifted 
back onto society.ss8 Those who utilize a fairness analysis would 
shift only the excess increment of loss onto society.339 As such, 
something less than an owner's full property or special losses 
might be due. 
The choice of compensation goals - redistribution, protec-
tion or fairness - affects whether non-property losses are com-
pensable in taking cases. Considerations of fairness to society 
may also affect the availability of consequentials. In an eminent 
333. 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1976). 
334. Sax, supra note 74, at 57-58. 
335. [d. at 53. 
336. [d. at 61. Sax, apparently frustrated with the problems of defining "government 
enterprise" and trying to develop a basis for property value that ignored events outside 
the property's boundaries, later abandoned the arbitral/enterprise theory for an ecologi-
cal view of property which admitted that property values and use were part of a social 
ecosystem. Since most uses had impacts beyond property boundaries, only those use im-
pacts limited to the confines of given property were compensable if "taken" by regula-
tion. It appears that Sax found most government regulation to be arbitral. See Sax, 
supra note 101, at 155-62. 
337. See Michelman, supra note 101, and Costonis, supra note 23. Both Michelman 
and Costonis are concerned about capricious redistribution of wealth by government 
acts, but both reject full compensation (i.e., the market value standard). Coston is feels 
that compensation should reimburse an owner only for taking reasonable beneficial use, 
not best and highest use. Coston is at 1022-23. Michelman feels compensation should be 
paid only if settlement costs are greater than the efficiency gains and demoralization 
costs of the regulation, and would protect individual owners only from "concentrated" 
losses. Michelman at 1213, 1222. 
338. See, e.g., Ciamporcero, 'Fair' is Fair: Valuing the Regulatory Taking, 15 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 741, 754 (1982). See Blume and Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An 
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L.REV. 569, 615 (1984), for a discussion of zoning by Special 
Assessment Financed Eminent Domain Statutes in Minnesota. 
339. Ciamporcero, supra note 338, at 756; Coston is, supra note 23, at 1050-52. 
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domain context, just compensation means compensation that is 
just to the public as well as the individual. 340 This may mean 
balancing public and private interests in arriving at just com-
pensation. In a regulatory context, the sheer number of regula-
tory acts exposes the government to fiscal disaster.34} The pay-
ment of compensation for regulatory acts may also inhibit local 
officials and present separation of power problems. In order to 
be just to the public, compensation for regulatory takings should 
be fair but should not be a windfall. As a result, most courts 
have adopted the eminent domain standard, which focuses on 
property value alone,342 and which does not award consequential 
damages.343 Only a few courts are willing to award damages that 
are not directly tied to property in regulatory taking cases.344 
Compensation in such cases should be calculated on the basis of 
the property interest taken, which is the right to beneficial use. 
Market forces compensate for consequential losses. Property 
value rebounds after the regulation effecting the taking is invali-
dated. As a result, there may be a net gain to the plaintiff 
whether or not development costs were expended. In Cordeco 
Development Corporation v. Santiago Vasquez,34~ the plaintiff 
340. Chesapeake & Ohio Canal v. Key, 3 Cranch CC 599, 601 (1829), cited in 
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 570 (1897). See also United States v. Commodities Trad-
ing Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
341. Even though the fiscal disaster argument was rejected in Owen v. City of Inde-
pendence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), a non-taking case, local officials remain presumably less 
than enthusiastic about paying compensation in regulatory taking cases - especially in 
light of the current fiscal conservatism evidenced by such measures as California's infa-
mous "Prop. 13" (Jarvis-Gann Proposition 13 Initiative, codified at Cal. Const. art. 13A, 
§§1-6). See also Johnson, supra note 130, at 563. 
342. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Hernandez 
v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981). The Kimball rationale upholds 
a strict property approach that reimbursement is due only for what is taken, and other 
consequentials are disallowed except as they go to prove property value. 
343. United States v. Petty, 327 U.S. 372, 378 (1946). Petty also rejected valuation 
based on the value of property to the specific owner, holding that market value doesn't 
fluctuate with the needs of the condemnor or condemnee, but only with general market 
demand for property. [d. at 377. 
344. See Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), 
which awarded the developer interest on lost profits. However, Sixth Camden Corp. v. 
Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D.N.J. 1976), rejects the lost profits basis, holding 
that future profits are not compensable. [d. at 729. Sheerr v. Evesham Township, 184 
N.J. Super. 11, 445 A.2d 46 (1982), also rejected lost profits as "too uncertain to permit 
proof'. ld. at 65, 445 A.2d 75. This seems in line with the fact that invalidation elimi-
nates future losses. See Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. See also Keystone Associates v. 
Moerdler, 19 N.Y. 2d 78, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 224 N.E.2d 700 (1966), which awarded carry-
ing charges incurred during the period of the temporary taking. 
345. 539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 19'76). 
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tried to use lost profits to measure the compensation due. Con-
spiring with a wealthy landowner, government officials had used 
the permit process to prevent the plaintiff from extracting and 
marketing sand deposits on its land. The court refused to use 
the lost profits as the measure of damages because the sand had 
doubled in value.346 
Rejecting consequential damages in constitutional taking 
cases is appropriate in light of the fact that tort damages are 
seldom awarded in taking cases brought under the Section 1983 
civil rights statute.347 In Carey v. Piphus,348 a 1983 action, sev-
eral male students were suspended without hearings for using 
marijuana and wearing earrings on campus. They were allowed 
to recover nominal damages without proof of loss on the theory 
that the right to procedural due process is absolute. The Su-
preme Court held that the right to damages flowed from the vio-
lation alone, even absent proof of injury.349 However, the major-
ity opinion noted that a tort rule of damages would not apply to 
every Section 1983 case.3IiO The majority felt that compensation 
should be tailored to the interest protected.351 A lower federal 
court subsequently rejected damages in a Section 1983 regulatory 
taking case. It held that they were discretionary, not mandatory, 
in Section 1983 taking cases, and found them inappropriate 
under the particular circumstances of the case.352 In Hernandez 
v. City of Lafayette,353 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt 
with a 1983 action by deferring to eminent domain standards 
and focusing on property value. The Circuit Court held that an 
action for damages would lie under 1983 in favor of any person 
whose property was taken without just compensation, but that 
346. [d. at 262. 
347. 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides a damages remedy to a person 
claiming deprivation of a federal constitutional right by a person or entity acting under 
color of state law. Thus, an owner whose property has been taken by regulation can sue 
directly under the Constitution's fifth amendment for just compensation, or under Sec-
tion 1983 for damages. 
348. 435 U.S. 247 (1978). 
349. [d. at 266-67. 
350. [d. at 258. 
351. [d. at 259. 
352. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901, 903 (D. Nev. 
1979). 
353. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981). 
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the proper measure of damages in such an action was an amount 
equal to the value of the property for the period of the taking.3114 
3. Rejection of the best and highest use standard 
In eminent domain, compensation is awarded on the basis 
of the best and highest use of the land under the existing zon-
ing. 31111 The eminent domain standard is not easily applied to reg-
ulatory takings.3116 An owner does not have a vested right to ex-
isting zoning,3117 and may not be able - or motivated - to put the 
property to its best and highest use.3118 It seems unreasonable to 
calculate compensation at the best and highest use of property 
when that use is not available to an owner. In Usdin v. State 
Department of Environmental Protection,3119 the court awarded 
the plaintiff only three years of compensation even though the 
offending regulation had been in effect for six years. It reduced 
the compensation because the plaintiff was not ready, willing 
and able to develop until halfway through the period of regula-
tion.360 
There is nothing constitutionally compelling about the best 
and highest use standard.361 It is a judicially evolved doctrine362 
that developed in an era largely free of regulatory controls.363 In 
a modern land use context where a significant portion of land 
value is created by government controls,364 the best and highest 
354. Id. at 1200. 
355. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See also 6 NICHOLS, supra note 1, §25.41, and United States v. 
Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 256 (1980). 
356. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45; Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at 
618-23. 
357. Hagman, supra note 205, at 133; Johnson, supra note 130, at 566. 
358. See Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control 
Cases, Part 2, 4 ZONING AND PLAN. L. REPT. 137, 138 (1981); see also Usdin v. State Dept. 
of Environmental Protection, 173 N.J. Super 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980), which reduced a 
taking from six to three years because the developer was unable to perform for half of 
the period of the alleged taking. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91. 
359. 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980). 
360. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91. 
361. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042. 
362. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042. See also United States Commodities Trading 
Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950). 
363. Coston is, supra note 23, at 1042. 
364. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1043-44; Johnson, supra note 130, at 595. See also 
Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at 618-20: they feel the availability of compensa-
tion will encourage speculation and drive fair market values up. However, the argument 
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use formula gives the owner an added increment of value. 3611 The 
owner has no moral entitlement to such value, since he did noth-
ing to create it.366 The fact that not all land is available for all 
uses creates a large part of property value.367 
The alternative to calculating compensation on the basis of 
best and highest use is to use a reasonable beneficial use stan-
dard. Professor John J. Costonis recommended basing regula-
tory just compensation on reasonable beneficial use.368 Although 
he failed to clarify what constituted reasonable beneficial use,369 
the definition can be extracted. In Penn Central, the Supreme 
Court focused on whether there were any remaining permitted 
uses in evaluating whether a taking had occurred.370 The major-
ity equated permitted uses with productive uses.371 Therefore, it 
appears that a remaining permitted use and a reasonable benefi-
cial use are essentially the same thing. If no permitted uses re-
main, a taking has occurred and compensation should be mea-
sured by the difference between the land's value as regulated 
and its value with the minimal permitted use which would re-
move the taking. S72 
C. ADDITIONAL INNOVATIONS 
Rejecting consequential damages and the best and highest 
that zoning's impact on value is significant was rejected by Kmiec, supra note 228. He 
felt that zoning's impact on value was exaggerated, and that topography, available mu· 
nicipal services and transporation and the present and future uses of adjacent land were 
equally important. [d. at 70-71. 
365. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1042-45. 
366. Kmiec, supra note 228, at 71. See also Coston is, supra note 23, citing Bernard 
Siegan's quote from Mason Gaffney: "When the planning commission and the zoning 
board flit about sprinkling little golden showers here rather than there, they make mil-
lionaires of some and social reformers of others." [d. at 1027. 
367. For an alternate point of view, see supra note 364. 
368. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1049-55. 
369. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1052. See also Berger, The Accommodation Power 
in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUMB. L. REV. 799 
(1976). Coston is discusses five use categories falling between highest and best use and 
zero intensity use. A regulation which restricts use below reasonable beneficial use would 
be a taking and compensable, as measured by the difference of the land value measured 
at reasonable beneficial use and the permitted use which effects the taking. Coston is, 
supra note 23, at 1060. 
370. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136, 137 (1978). 
371. [d. at 136. 
372. Ciamporcero, supra note 338, at 756; Coston is, supra note 23, at 1051-52. 
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use standard partially resolves the calculation of just compensa-
tion in a regulatory context. Three issues remain: calculation of 
the duration of the taking, determination of the rate of 
payment, and development of a procedure for determining the 
level of use which will remove the taking. Alternatives to cash 
compensation should be explored in order to minimize the finan-
cial impact on local government. 
1. The duration of the regulatory taking 
Justice Brennan made it clear that just compensation for a 
regulatory taking should be calculated "for the period commenc-
ing on the date the regulation first effected the 'taking', and 
ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or 
otherwise amend the regulation".373 Modifications to Justice 
Brennan's standard have been suggested,s7. but it has already 
been adapted in state cases awarding interim damages.37CI 
2. Determination of the rate of compensation 
Compensation can be based on rental rates,376 or the fair 
373. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). 
374. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981). Hernandez 
suggests that the taking does not occur until "the municipality's governing body is given 
a realistic opportunity and reasonable time within which to review its zoning legislation 
vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the inequity." Id. at 1100. The Her-
nandez court ruled that fluctuations in value during such review proceedings were not 
compensable absent extraordinary delays, since they were incidents of ownership. Id. at 
1201. This appears reasonable in view of consistent court holdings that moratoriums im-
posed to allow regulations to be adopted do not effect compensable takings. See supra 
note 313. The Hernandez view was endorsed by Donald G. Hagman in Temporary or 
Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, supra note 205. Hagman seems to 
suggest the taking would be deemed to occur after notification to the government plus a 
not unreasonable time. Id. at 135. In Part 2 of his article, Hagman suggests application 
of the so-called severance rule, under which compensation would be based on the value 
immediately before and immediately after the taking in order to give the market time to 
react. See supra note 358. Hagman also suggests the taking should be reduced by the 
period of the developer's inability to perform, based on Usdin v. State Dept. of Environ-
mental Protection, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980), which reduced the length of 
an interim taking from six to three years. Id. at 332, 414 A.2d at 290-91. 
375. See supra note 324. 
376. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); Sixth Camden 
Corp. v. Evesham Township, 420 F. Supp. 709 (D. N.J. 1976); Kimball Laundry Co. v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949). See also Hagman, supra note 358, at 138-40. See Usdin, 
173 N.J. Super. 311, 318-19, 414 A.2d 280, 284 for an example of 8 generous rental 
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market value of an easement377 or option.378 The rental, ease-
ment or option value should be based not on the land's value 
under the oppressive regulation, but on its value with the rea-
sonable beneficial use which would remove the taking. Because 
most land involved in regulatory takings is undeveloped, the op-
tion selected would probably not greatly affect the total compen-
sation paid.879 The landowner will bear the burden of proof re-
garding the amount of compensation due. This burden will be an 
obstacle to recovery. In City of Austin v. Teague,380 for example, 
the court used a rental basis for calculation of just compensa-
tion. It held that the rule of certainty applied to rental losses 
and found that anticipated rentals from undeveloped land were 
inherently uncertain.381 Since the plaintiff's land had never been 
rented, there was no track record. Furthermore, the plaintiff had 
no specific development plans, which would have helped estab-
lish value. Therefore, even though the plaintiff established its 
right to compensation, none was awarded.382 The plaintiff simply 
failed to prove that the land would have produced any return.383 
3. Determination of the level of use 
The process of determining the reasonable beneficial use 
might involve a separation of powers problem. Some courts have 
mandated a specific use,384 which places the court in the position 
formula. Hagman feels that the rental compensation ordered in Usdin ($42,301.96 for 
three and one· half years) would probably chill, but adds "Perhaps the state should have 
been chilled." Hagman, supra note 358, at 139. 
377. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan 
seems to characterize the interest taken as an easement. 
378. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 113-14,237 A.2d 881, 884 
(1968). 
379. Hagman, supra note 358, at 140. 
380. 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978). 
381. Id. at 395. 
382. Id. at 394. 
383. Id. at 395. 
384. See Cosmopolitan Bank v. Village of Niles, Circuit Court of Cook County, (80 
L 17355, Jar.. 30, 1984), cited in Smith, Inverse Condemnation as a Remedy: Its Limita-
tions and Alternatives, 107, 125 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY, (The Compensation Is-
sue, Theories of Liability for Damages from Planning and Land Use Controls) (1984). In 
the Niles case, the Circuit Court invalidated the Zoning Board of Appeals and Planning 
Commission's denial of a use permit for a McDonald's restaurant and specifically permit-
ted the use. See also Pa. Stat. Ann. Title 53, §11011(2) (Purdon's Supp., 1980) which 
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of a superior zoning or planning commission. In one case, a dis-
trict court directed the jury to determine the level at which the 
property would probably have been allowed to develop and to 
base compensation on that determination.3811 This substitutes 
the jury's opinion for that of locally elected representatives. 
Other courts have invalidated a regulation but remanded to the 
legislature for adoption of new regulations.386 
Justice Brennan approved the concept in San Diego Gas.387 
Court involvement might be avoided completely by combining 
legislative remand with the Hernandez-Hagman notice idea. If a 
city were given, for example, six months to remove the taking, it 
could issue a Certificate of Alternate Use within that period. 
The Certificate would indicate which use or uses local govern-
ment would permit in order to relieve the claimed taking.388 If 
an owner were satisfied with the response, litigation could be 
avoided. If an owner has already sued, the court would retain 
jurisdiction and monitor government's responses. The parties 
could also consent to non-binding arbitration. 
Once the owner or the court accepts government's response 
as removing the taking, damages can be calculated from the date 
the regulation was adopted to the date it was rescinded. Value 
would be based on the negotiated or adjudicated use rights in 
the land. Once time frame and use level issues are resolved, ordi-
nary eminent domain compensation principles can be used to 
calculate the owner's damages.389 
allows a court to order site specific relief when an owner demonstrates that zoning re-
strictions are invalid as applied to his property. This allows site specific relief only, not 
rezoning, per Ellick v. Board of Supervisors of Worcester Township, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 
333 A.2d 239 (1975). 
385. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982 (N.D. Cal. 
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
386. Smith, supra note 384, at 121. See also Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 
F.2d 1188, 1200 (5th Cir. 1981), which approved such remand. 
387. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 660-61 (1981) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
388. Hagman, supra note 205, at 135. 
389. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan 
does raise the specter that some consequentials may be recoverable. Discussing cancella-
tion of eminent domain proceedings as precedent for the temporary regulatory taking 
where invalidation occurs, he argues that in both cases, the "cancellation" merely 
changes the property interest taken from full ownership to temporary use and occupa-
tion. He then adds "In such cases, compensation would be measured by the principles 
normally governing the taking of a right to use property temporarily." [d. at 658. Those 
47
Savery: Regulatory Taking
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1987
244 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:197 
Basing compensation on land use before the regulation may 
be an alternative to using negotiated use levels. Justice Brennan 
hinted at this possibility in San Diego Gas.390 Such an approach 
might result in unfairness. In Just u. Marinette County,391 for 
example, land was in a natural, undeveloped state before being 
regulated,392 so the court found that no existing use was taken.39s 
The fact that an owner has not used land in the past should not 
estop his future use. 
On remand, the states should be free to experiment with 
compensation procedures.394 The Constitution sets forth only 
the general principle of just compensation.3911 In eminent do-
main, the means of ascertaining that compensation are left to 
the public authorities.396 Florida, for example, already has a 
statute, modeled on the American Land Institute Model Land 
Development Code, which provides for repeal or monetary dam-
ages as alternative remedies in regulatory cases.397 Minnesota 
utilized a unique statutory rezoning procedure in the 1960's. It 
authorized the establishment of residential districts if fifty per-
cent of the property owners in the district petitioned for the 
change.398 The scheme authorized condemnation of property in 
certain excluded classes when a district was rezoned, and con-
tained provisions for the appraisal, valuation and payment of 
principles were set out in cases like United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 383 
(1945), which awarded consequentials including moving and storage costs and payment 
for destroyed fixtures. See also Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 114, 
237 A.2d 881, 884 (1968), which approved reimbursing plaintiff for engineering costs re-
lated to plot approval and for property taxes for the period of the taking. Arguably, 
these consequential cases would not apply to many regulatory takings which involve bare 
land and do not interrupt businesses. 
390. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 659. 
391. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). 
392. [d. at 23, 201 N.W.2d at 770·71. 
393. [d. 
394. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The only re-
strictions Justice Brennan would place on such procedures are that they "comport with 
the fundamental constitutional command", i.e., allow an owner a meaningful opportunity 
to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects a taking and recover just compensation if 
it does so, without being forced to resort to piecemeal litigation or unfair procedures. [d. 
395. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 660 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
396. [d. 
397. See Fla. Stat. Ann., §380.085 (West Supp., 1986). 
398. Minn. Stat. Ann., §§462.11 and 462.12 (West, 1963). Section 462.11 was re-
pealed in 1965. 
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damages.399 The existing eminent domain procedures, which em-
panel a separate jury to determine property value, are also work-
able in a regulatory context, and have, in fact, already been 
used.40o 
Legislative remand gives government the opportunity to re-
scind and payor to maintain the regulation in force perma-
nently or for an unspecified period.401 Regulatory flexibility is 
maximized and the government is not forced to pay for a fee 
interest every time a regulation is determined to "take". On re-
mand, government can balance the value of the regulation 
against its financial cost. Separation of power problems are min-
imized because the decision to invalidate or compensate rests 
with the legislature.402 Not incidentally, the quality of regulation 
is improved, because government is forced to look at all the im-
pacts of regulation, not just the benefits it hopes to obtain with-
out paying. The continuing jurisdiction of the courts preserves 
the property owner's protections. 
4. The temporary taking alternative 
Local government may find the temporary taking an attrac-
tive alternative to eminent domain proceedings. Since land use 
patterns change, a city's goals may often be accomplished by 
short-term prohibitory regulation. A city may, for example, wish 
to slow growth, not stop it.403 A prospective taking of five or ten 
years may allow it to accomplish such goal. The compensation 
due for a regulatory taking should be less than in eminent do-
main since local government would pay only the easement/op-
tion/rental value of the land for the period of regulation, not for 
the fee. 
There are necessarily limits on prospective takings. The 
399. Minn. Stat. Ann., §§462.13 and 462.14 (West Supp., 1987). 
400. Arastra Ltd. Partnership v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp. 962, 982 (N.D. Cal. 
1975), vacated 417 F. Supp. 1125 (N.D. Cal. 1976). 
401. See Kmiec, supra note 228, at 62-63; San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San 
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 659-60 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Alternatively, the govern-
ment may choose formally to condemn·the property, or otherwise to continue the offend-
ing regulation .... " ). 
402. San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 658; Comment, supra note 83, at 725. 
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court in Arverne Bay Construction Company v. Thatcher found 
a regulatory taking "permanent" after nine years.404 Indefinite, 
extended takings clearly tie up capital and are probably ineffi-
cient.4OII They depress development and discourage real estate 
investment.406 They may also be unreasonable restraints on 
alienation. In light of Arverne, a nine- or ten-year limit on pro-
spective takings should be reasonable. 
Compensation for the prospective taking should be paid in 
annual installments. Initially, local government will determine, 
on remand, via a Certificate of Alternate Use, a level of use 
which would remove the taking. The value of the property at 
that use would be calculated and paid annually. Since compen-
sation is based on the use level indicated in the Certificate, local 
government does not get the benefit of depressed values attribu-
table to the regulation.407 After a maximum of ten years, govern-
ment would be forced to elect between condemnation or allowing 
the land to be used at the level indicated on the Certificate. 
Courts could easily fashion such an order.408 
Local government could pay for prospective takings with 
developer exactions.409 Such exactions are already used to force 
subdividers to pay' for the installation of roads, sewer and water 
services and to extract school and park dedications.4lO Such ex-
actions, in the form of higher application fees, could be used to 
build an insurance fund out of which local government could 
pay for temporary takings.411 
404. Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 233, 15 N.E.2d 587, 
592 (1938). 
405. Michelman, supra note 101, at 1213-15. 
406. Id. 
407. See generally Hagman, supra note 205, at 131, for a discussion of judicial aver-
sion to the use of regulations to lower acquisition costs. 
408. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y. 2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 
257 N.E.2d 870 (1970), where the court issued a prospective injunction which would take 
effect only if the defendant failed to pay permanent damages to the plaintiff for its ease-
ment to pollute. 
409. R ELLICKSON & AD. TARLOCK. LAND-USE CONTROLS, 737-60 (1981). Local gov-
ernment often extracts user fees, cash contributions or dedications as the price of devel-
opment approval. Id. at 738. 
410. [d. at 738. Exactions may be statutory. Cal. Gov't Code §66477 (West Supp., 
1987) specifically authorizes local governments to exact park dedications or in lieu cash 
contributions as a condition of tentative map approval. 
411. Blume and Rubinfeld, supra note 338, at 571-72,582-89. The authors note that 
private insurance against regulatory losses is not available. [d. at 582. The lack of insur-
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5. Of/sets and marketworthy alternatives 
Government may be able to avoid paying compensation 
completely by using more creative forms of regulation, including 
offsets. Offsets, or value exchanges flowing from the government 
to the property owner are critical in two ways: in eliminating the 
taking and in providing non-monetary forms of just compensa-
tion. Offsets may include tax relief. In Furey v. City of Sacra-
mento,m the City established a sewer district in an area 
targeted for residential development. It placed the area in a zon-
ing classification that precluded residential use.H3 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that the ordinance was invalid unless 
the owners were relieved of their sewer assessments.414 
Benefits which reduce the regulation's impact on use can 
avert a taking. Transferable development rights (TDR's) are an 
example.m A city may deny development at a given site (the 
granting lot) but allow a developer to transfer previously vested 
development rights to another site (the receiving lot). TDR's can 
be sold and therefore have at least some market value.H6 The 
availability of TDR's in Fred F. French Investment Company v. 
City of New York417 and Penn Central418 were important in de-
termining whether a taking had occurred. In Fred F. French, the 
New York Supreme Court invalidated a City ordinance which 
restricted development on private parklands despite a TDR pro-
gram because there were no receiving lots for the TDR's.4111 In 
ance results in inefficient land use and subsidizes speculators. [d. at 587-88. Government 
insurance, in the form of compensation, would evenly distribute the risk of regulation, 
but would also present a conflict of interest since government would be insuring against 
its own acts. [d. at 571-72, 599. 
412. 24 Cal. 3d 862, 598 P.2d 844, 157 Cal. Rptr. 684, app. dism. 444 U.S. 976 
(1979). 
413. [d. at 868, 598 P.2d at 847, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 687. 
414. [d. at 877, 878, 598 P.2d at 853, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 692, 693. 
415. TORs or Transferred Development Rights are a mechanism which allows a de-
veloper to transfer his development rights on a designated "granting parcel" to other 
"receiving parcels" when they cannot be used on the granting parcel because of land use 
restrictions. See generally Costonis, supra note 23, at 1061-70, for a discussion of TORs. 
416. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 
350 N.E.2d 381 (1976); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.s. 104 (1978). 
417. 39 N.Y. 2d. 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381 (1976). 
418. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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Penn Central, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had 
not been denied the use of airspace above its railroad terminal 
because the use rights were transferable to at least eight parcels 
in the terminal's vicinity. The majority opinion stopped short of 
finding that the TDR's were just compensation, but agreed that 
they mitigated the owner's financial burdens.420 
The economic value of TDR's can be illusory, depending on 
how easily they can be transferred, market demand and the exis-
tence of legislative conditions on their use.421 In Fred F. French, 
the court found that few receiving lots were available and that 
their availability was contingent on administrative approvals.422 
Because of this, the TDR program failed to preserve the eco-
nomic value of the owner's development rights.423 Local govern-
ment must be careful that offsets and alternatives to cash com-
pensation have reasonably certain value. 
Other kinds of government programs can relieve a taking. In 
Golden u. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,424 the Town's 
growth management plan was upheld even though it barred de-
velopment for 18 years. It was sustainable because the Town re-
duced property taxes in proportion to the depreciation caused 
by the restriction, allowed the landowner the option of accelerat-
ing development by installing municipal services himself, guar-
anteed development according to the Town's capital improve-
ment timetable, and vested future development rights.421i Less 
420. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 137. 
421. The court in Fred F. French, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381, 
found that TDRs granted by the City of New York did not preserve the developer's 
rights to use land because the availability of receiving lots depended on happenstance 
and their use was contingent on administrative approvals, adding "In such case, the de-
velopment rights, disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity, float in a limbo until 
restored to reality by attachment to tangible real property." Id. at 598, 385 N.Y.S. 2d at 
11, 350 N.E.2d at 388. But see Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, where the court found the 
TDRs proferred were transferable to at least eight parcels in the block surrounding the 
terminal and therefore valuable. Id. at 137. The Penn Central court added that, while 
the rights might not have constituted just compensation, had a taking occurred, they 
nevertheless mitigated the impact of the regulation, and were "to be taken into account 
in considering the impact of regulation." Id. at 137. 
422. Fred F. French, 39 N.Y. 2d at 598, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11, 350 N.E.2d at 388. 
423. Id. 
424. 30 N.Y. 2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972). 
425. Id. at 382, 334 N.Y.S.2d 155, 285 N.E.2d 304. See Coston is, supra note 23, at 
1055-60. Coston is sees Ramapo's actions as an exercise of the "accommodation power" 
which maintained reasonable beneficial use. It looks more like an intelligent use of the 
52
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss2/2
1987] REGULATORY TAKING 249 
complex approaches may also work. In Corrigan v. City of 
Scottsdale,m city ordinances allowed an owner to increase the 
residential density on his developable land' as compensation for 
development restrictions on the remaining portions of his prop-
erty.427 The density credits were rejected as just compensation 
only because the Arizona constitution required monetary 
compensation.428 
There are indications that the Supreme Court has shifted 
its view of offsets and may be willing to consider them not just 
in evaluating whether a taking has occurred, but in terms of 
whether they represent just compensation. In MacDonald, Som-
mer & Frates, the Court divided the regulatory taking claim into 
two components: 1. the taking - i.e., proof that a regulation has 
gone too far, and 2. absence of compensation, i.e., proof that any 
compensation offered by the state is not just.429 This signals a 
shift away from weighing offsets in evaluating the taking to 
viewing them in terms of whether they represent just compensa-
tion. This may allow the courts to resolve taking cases more eas-
ily because focusing on the justness of compensation - i.e., 
marketworthy alternatives and other forms of conventional or 
nonconventional compensation - may be easier than trying to 
decide whether all use was taken. 
There is no reason just compensation must be in dollars.43o 
The use of marketworthy alternatives should reduce the finan-
cial impact on cities as well as protecting property owners. The 
offsets must have enough tangible value: money value, not spec-
ulative value, is still the test.431 While valuing offsets may be 
police power. Towns could avert many takings if they structured their regulations more 
fairly. 
426. No. 18239-PR (Ariz., June 2, 1986). 
427. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR, slip op. at 3 (Ariz., June 2, 1986). 
428. [d. at 4. 
429. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566 (1986). 
See also Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3121 (1985) 
(State action not complete until state fails to provide adequate postdeprivation remedy 
for loss). 
430. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 581-84 (1897). See also Costonis, supra note 23, 
at 1030-45. Coston is feels the emphasis on dollar compensation is misplaced. The Ari-
zona State Constitution, however, requires that compensation be monetary. See Corrigan 
v. City of Scottsdale, No. 18239-PR (Ariz., June 2, 1986). 
431. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y. 2d 587, 597-98, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 5, 11-12, 350 N.E.2d 381. 388 (1976). 
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difficult, it need not be impossible: as Professor John J. Costonis 
points out, we regularly value the impact of sewer improvements 
in assessing special district taxes.432 The use of alternative forms 
of compensation will still result in some financial loss to local 
government. They may preserve enough use to prevent a regula-
tion from being a taking. However, as compensation, they may 
not have enough tangible value to fully compensate an owner for 
the interest taken,433 and some monetary compensation may still 
be due. For example, courts may find that the existence of 
vested future development rights in a Golden-type situation pre-
vents a regulatory taking. Used as compensation, however, the 
vested rights may not have a dollar value equal to the rental! 
option/easement compensation due in a taking context. 
Finally, marketworthy alternatives may be used in court or-
ders providing equitable relief, either as the equivalent of just 
compensation or as measures which would relieve the taking.434 
v. MACDONALD, SOMMER & FRATES, A CASE STUDY 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo431i is a use-
ful case study. The plaintiff's 44-acre parcel was located in the 
County of Yolo, outside Davis City limits. The parcel was zoned 
residential by Yolo County, but designated "Agricultural Pre-
serve" by Davis, which embraced the land in its sphere of influ-
ence.m The County, which had included the land in a local 
sewer district to which the owner had contributed over $75,000 
in assessments,437 gerrymandered the sewer district borders after 
the Davis action and took the property out of the district, effec-
tively cutting the property off from service.438 Davis refused the 
owner's proposed extension of existing streets and rerouted 
other mapped streets to isolate the property. It refused both 
432. Costonis, supra note 23, at 1041. 
433. Id. 
434. Mandelker, supra note 203, at 504-05. The author feels that a legislative trend 
toward fashioning more specific injunctive relief would save cities money and give 
greater relief to landowners. Such orders would relieve the taking, i.e., make the regula-
tion constitutional, so that a town would not be liable for just compensation. 
435. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986). 
436. Appellant's Brief at 5, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. 
Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2015). 
437. Id. at 4. 
438. Id. at 6. 
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dedication of public facilities and annexation of the property.439 
When the owner appl~ed for a subdivision map as a first step 
toward residential development, the County denied its applica-
tion on four grounds: lack of access, lack of sewer services, insuf-
ficient fire and police protection and inadequate water.440 The 
Board went even further: it determined that the property could 
be used only for agricultural purposes.441 Since a foot of topsoil 
had been removed and the land was infested with ineradicable 
pests, the land was useless for agriculture.442 The Yolo County 
Board admitted the fact, calling the land "agriculturally im-
paired".443 The owner, after another unsuccessful administrative 
appeal,444 sued for a taking. 
The Supreme Court held that the taking claim was prema-
ture because the plaintiff had not exhausted its administrative 
remedies,HII agreeing with the California Court of Appeals that 
the County's refusal to permit the degree of development 
desired by the landowner did not preclude less intensive 
development.446 
The multi-agency involvement made the plaintiff's position 
particularly uncomfortable. It was caught in a Catch 22 snare: it 
was unable to satisfy the County's map requirements because 
Davis would not provide city services and because the County 
itself would not provide sewers. 
The petition procedure, had it been available in California, 
might have resolved the impasse. On denial of his appeal, the 
owner could have issued a formal letter to the City and County, 
claiming a taking. Its issuance would have forced Davis to 
reevaluate its position and negotiate with the County, resulting 
in a written determination of the level of development that both 
439. [d. 
440. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2563, 2564 
n.2 (1986). 
441. [d. at 2564 n.2. See also Appellant's Brief at 7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates 
v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2105). 
442. Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) 
(No. 84-2105). 
443. [d. at 7. 
444. [d. 
445. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2568-69 
(1986). 
446. [d. at 2565-67, 2567 n. 2. 
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the County and Davis would have tolerated in order to avoid a 
taking claim. If both stonewalled, the letter would have at least 
fixed the date of exhaustion of remedies and of the taking: 
the taking date would have been the date of the letter plus a 
reasonable response time. 
The County and the City, at this juncture, could also have 
considered marketworthy alternatives: reduction of taxes, TDRs, 
offers to allow development if the owner installed services,m or 
vesting of future development rights, perhaps at levels lower 
than requested. 
In any resulting litigation, satisfaction of the exhaustion re-
quirement would have forced the courts to consider a taking on 
its merits. Applying the action versus intent standard in light of 
surrounding circumstances (property condition, social and eco-
nomic conditions, the course of the government's conduct) the 
court might well have found a taking: Davis' acts clearly prohib-
ited any residential use in light of the County's requirements 
and vice versa. 
Had a taking been found, the case would have been re-
manded to the appropriate superior court which would order the 
County and Davis to issue Certificates of Alternate Use, to es-
tablish the minimal use level which would remove the taking, 
and to declare their intent to rescind, condemn or effect a pro-
spective taking of up to ten years. 
In the event of either rescission or a prospective taking, the 
court would use the Certificate to set compensation levels based 
on the option or rental value of the land for the period of the 
taking. In a prospective taking, the compensation would be reas-
sessed each year. At the end of ten years, the land would be 
deemed subject to the use indicated on the Certificate if the gov-
ernment did not decide to condemn. In a condemnation, the 
owner would be compensated at the market value of the prop-
erty at the use level indicated on the Certificate. 
Marketworthy alternatives approved by the court could be 
447. But note: the owners had offered to do 80. See Appellant's Brief at 6, MacDon-
ald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986) (No. 84-2105). 
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used at this point to offset some or all of the compensation due, 
subject to court approval and reasonably non-speculative value. 
The County could, for' example, suppress property taxes for a 
designated period or pay for the installation of municipal ser-
vices such as sewer hook-ups which the developer would other-
wise bear. The burden of proving the value of marketworthy al-
ternatives would be on the government. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Amendment does not distinguish between takings 
that are a result of eminent domain and those that occur be-
cause of regulation.448 A taking is that which takes.449 A unified 
approach to takings is mandated by the Constitution and by no-
tions of fundamental fairness. By identifying the property inter-
est involved, using circumstantial review, clarifying when admin-
istrative remedies have been exhausted and standardizing 
valuation, regulatory takings can be treated like the acts of emi-
nent domain they really are. It is time to find the quark. 
End Note. In June, 1987, the Supreme Court made two ma-
jor contributions to the law of regulatory takings: it held that 
invalidation did not relieve government of the duty to compen-
sate where its activity has taken all use of property,4IiO and that a 
condition on the. use of property must be related to a specific 
legislative purpose.461 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles41S2 was the product of a county flood con-
trol ordinance adopted after spring floods ravaged canyonlands 
in the Angeles National Forest. The ordinance prohibited all 
building in the flood cohtrol zone, preventing the plaintiff from 
rebuilding a church camp destroyed in the floods. 41S3 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeals assumed that the complaint sought dam-
448. Bauman, supra note 26, at 49. 
449. Id. 
450. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4786 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
451. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5148 (U.S. June 
23, 1987). 
452. 55 U.S.L.W. 4781 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
453. [d. at 4782. 
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ages for an uncompensated taking of all use, and denied relief on 
the basis of Agins u. Tiburon,""" concluding that the remedy for 
a taking was limited to nonmonetary relief.""" Isolation of the 
remedial question allowed the Supreme Court to bypass the 
usual stumbling blocks: exhaustion of remedies and definition of 
the taking. ""6 
In Nollan u. California Coastal Commission,m the Court 
was confronted with an attack on a condition to a building per-
mit issued by the Coastal Commission. The Commission re-
quired dedication of a public beach access easement in exchange 
for a permit to enlarge an existing residence. m The Supreme 
Court rejected the condition because it was not related to the 
original purpose of the building restriction. ""9 The Commission, 
allegedly concerned about the public's visual access to the coast, 
failed to convince the Court that taking a physical access ease-
ment in exchange for a permit to block visual access advanced 
its primary purpose.460 Absent a nexus between purpose and 
condition, the Commission's acts amounted to extortion, to a 
taking of property for which it must pay.461 
Although significant, the June decisions ignore important 
taking issues and raise new questions. For example, neither case 
addresses exhaustion of remedies, and neither tackles the thorny 
issue of defining a regulatory taking. First Church refers to such 
a taking as "deprivation of all use".462 However, the Court 
merely assumed a taking and never dealt with the question of 
when an owner has been deprived of all use.463 Nollan found ex-
action of the easement a taking by analogy to physical invasion 
cases such as Loretto u. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV,"64 and 
454. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). 
455. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4783 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
456. [d. at 4783-84. 
457. 55 U.S.L.W. 5145 (U.S. June 23, 1987). 
458. [d. at 5145. 
459. [d. at 5148. 
460. [d. 
461. [d. 
462. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4785 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
463. [d. at 4783-84. 
464. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
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to principles of extortion,46~ concepts easier to manipulate than 
those involved in downzoning. In fact, instead of clarifying tak-
ing standards, Nollan complicates them. It adopts both the 
nexus requirement466 and stricter scrutiny of police power regu-
lations which affect property.467 Apparently abandoning the 
usual deference to exercises of the police power which are ra-
tionally related to a legitimate state interest, the Court demands 
that such an exercise substantially advance a public interest 
where it abridges property rights.468 Unfortunately, it does not 
clarify whether investment-backed expectations are a property 
right, leaving planners to wonder whether and at what point a 
developer's reliance on preliminary approvals will trigger this 
stricter scrutiny. 
The two cases leave the issue of compensation largely un-
resolved. First Church seems to indicate that the leasehold value 
of the regulated property should be used as a basis for calculat-
ing compensation,469 but does not resolve whether such value is 
to be based on the best and highest use of the property or some-
thing less. It holds that compensation is due for the entire pe-
riod of time that a regulation denies an owner all use of his 
property,470 but excludes "preliminary activity" from the taking 
period.471 Its failure to define preliminary activity adds another 
complication to the compensation picture: it is less clear than 
. ever how the duration of the taking should be calculated. 
Neither case addresses the use of marketworthy alternatives to 
cold cash. While Nollan deals unfavorably with the use of exac-
tions by the state as a condition to development, it does not dis-
cuss the converse situation where government provides an owner 
special privileges or offsets in exchange for development restric-
tions on his property. 
The regulatory taking impasse is far from resolved. Justice 
Stevens warned in his Nollan dissent that land-use planners are 
465. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5146, 5148 (U.S. 
June 23, 1987). 
466. [d. at 5148. 
467. [d. at 5149. 
468. [d. 
469. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Ange-
les, 55 U.S.L.W. 4781, 4785-86 (U.S. June 9, 1987). 
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left guessing "how the Court will react to the next case, and the 
one after that."472 In fact, all sides are left guessing. The unified 
field theory still needs more work. 
Barbara J. Savery * 
472. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 55 U.S.L.W. 5145, 5156 (U.S. June 
23, 1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
• Third year law student (Class of 1988), Golden Gate University School of Law. 
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